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I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
A. FETAL RIGHTS 
1. A child has a cause of action based on the constitu-
tional violation of his right to familial companionship 
and society, even though a fetus at father's death. 
Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1991). John 
Crumpton, a six year old boy, brought a civil rights action 
under 42 U.S.C. § 19831 against Los Angeles Police Chief 
Daryl Gates, several former police chiefs, and various political 
officials, including the Mayor of Los Angeles, Tom Bradley. 
Crumpton alleged that the killing of his father by an alleged 
"death squad" team of the L.A. police department constituted 
a violation of his own constitutional rights. 
The district court granted summary judgment on the ground 
that, because Crumpton was a fetus at the time his father 
was killed, he was not a person within the meaning of § 1983, 
and was therefore unable to bring the civil rights claim. The 
U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded 
holding that Crumpton's injury and cause of action did not arise 
until his birth, and therefore he was entitled to proceed in his 
civil rights claim. The case was one of first impression and the 
court noted, "our research has uncovered no federal case on all 
fours."2 Nevertheless, the court used common law tort prin-
ciples, rejected the potential to impact the important principles 
behind'Roe v Wade3 and made a sound, thoughtful decision. 
But, as this note will examine, potential dangers loom from the 
decision: namely the potential implications for women and 
their constitutional right to privacy. 
The story begins on September 15, 1982, when a group of 
police officers of the L.A. police department "death squad" 
killed John Crumpton's father. The mission of the "death 
squad" officers was to execute those criminals who were "escap-
ing the arm of the law in that they were not being convicted for 
crimes they had committed, and when convicted, their sen-
tences were too short and/or inadequate."· At the time of his 
father's death, Crumpton was a two-month old fetus. 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) [hereinafter § 19831. 
2 Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418,1420 (9th Cir. 1991). 
3. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
4. Crumpton, 947 F.2d at 1419. 
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Six years later, Crumpton brought a civil rights action for 
his own damages sustained as a result of the loss of his father. 
Under § 1983, Crumpton sought compensatory and punitive 
damages based on violations of his Fourteenth Amendment 
rights, namely an assertion of his substantive due process 
rights based on the violation of his right to familial compan-
ionship and society.6 
The applicable law, § 1983, does not create substantive 
rights, it merely serves as the procedural device for enforcing 
substantive provisions of the Constitution and federal statutes.6 
Thus, as the court indicated, a § 1983 plaintiff must allege an 
independent basis for relief, namely a violation of rights pro-
tected by the Constitution or created by federal statute.7 Here, 
while the Fourth Amendment right of Crumpton's father "not 
to be subjected to the use of excessive force" did not give rise 
to Crumpton's own cause of action, in Smith v. City of Fontana8 , 
the court allowed the decedent's children to assert a substan-
tive due process claim based on the violation of their right to 
familial companionship and society.9 The court in Fontana 10 
characterized the child's interest as "a cognizable liberty inter-
est which the state has no legitimate interest in interfering 
with ... through the use of excessive force."11 Moreover, the 
Crumpton court noted that congressional intent found in the 
legislative history of § 1983's precursor, the Klu Klux Klan Act, 
was to remedy the "wrongs, arsons, and murders done. "12 In 
particular, this remedy was available for those children whose 
father had been killed. 
In addition to alleging "a deprivation of constitutional pro-
portion"IS to sustain relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must be 
a citizen of the United States or other "person."14 Indeed, "the 
crux of this case ... ", according to the court, was "not the nature 
5. Crumpton, 947 F.2d at 1420. In addition, Crumpton sought injunctive relief 
in the form of either an order that the "death squad" disband or court supervision of 
"death squad" activities. 
6. See, e.g. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979); 
and Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). 
7. Crumpton, 947 F.2d at 1420. 




11. ld. at 1419·20. 
12. ld. at 1421. 
13. Crumpton, 947 F.2d at 1421. 
14. [d. 
4
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of the constitutional right asserted, but rather who may bring 
a suit under § 1983."16 (emphasis added). 
Defendants cited Roe v. Wade 18 to support their argument 
that Crumpton was not a proper party to bring a cause of 
action under § 1983. According to Roe17 , the word "person" as 
used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the 
unborn. IS The defendants argued that because Crumpton was 
a fetus at the time his father was killed, Crumpton was not a 
"person" as contemplated by § 1983 and required under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, he was precluded from 
raising a cause of action. The district court adopted this rea-
soning and granted summary judgment. The U.S. Court of 
Appeals departed entirely from this line of reasoning and 
found that Roe v Wade was "inapposite."IB "This case ... does 
not involve a physical injury to a fetus. Here the substantive 
constitutional injury upon which Crumpton relies is ... a sub-
stantive due process liberty interest in having familial relations 
with a parent. "20 
Despite the fact that the child was a fetus at the time of his 
father's murder, the child's injury and cause of action for loss of 
familial companionship arose at the time of his birth.21 Thus, 
according to the U.S., Crumpton was a "person" under the 14th 
Amendment of the Constitution and therefore able to bring a 
claim under § 1983. The court reached this conclusion by dis-
tinguishing the wrongful act of the father's murder from the actu-
al injury it ultimately inflicted upon the little boy. The issue 
framed by the court was not whether John Crumpton had any 
rights while he was a fetus. Instead, in permitting him to bring 
a claim that he was unconstitutionally deprived of his father, the 
court focused on the common law tort concept that "although the 
term 'wrongful act' is often thought to be synonymous with the 
injury, if an injury does not result immediately, the cause of 
action arises upon its occurrence."22 
Similarly, although the wrongful act occurred while 
Crumpton was in utero, the injury or suffering which flowed 
15.Id. 
16. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113. 
17. [d. 
18. [d. at 158. 
19. Crumpton, 947 F.2d at 1421. 
20. Id. at 1422. 
21. Id. 
22. Vaughn v. J.C. Penney, Inc., 822 F.2d 605, 609-10 (6th Cir.) (1987). 
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from that wrongful act occurred postnatally. The focus of the 
inquiry therefore was the time of injury. According to the 
court: "[ w ]here a child claims unwarranted state interference 
with his rights to familial companionship and society, the 
injury to this right can only occur after birth since a familial 
right cannot arise until a fetus is born and actually suffers from 
not having a parent."23 
The court's decision is sound and logical; it is supported by 
applicable case law, particularly in the area of torts, and sup-
ported by the history and legislative intent of § 1983 to be 
"broadly construed to effectuate remedial purposes."24 Yet, the 
legal community has called this an "unusual legal ruling. "26 In 
particular, the court failed to address the issue of whether a 
fetus was a person, and left many unanswered questions about 
the rights of a fetus to assert a § 1983 claim. 
The court specifically avoided relying on Roe v. Wade 26 , 
thus "sidestepping the issue of whether a fetus should be con-
sidered a person with the right to sue in federal courts. "27 The 
attorney who represented John Crumpton commented after 
their victory: "the case now brings within the coverage of fed-
eral civil rights all persons who were in utero at the time that 
injuries were inflicted on their parents."26 Has the court real-
ly sidestepped Roe29, or rather has the decision moved us clos-
er to recognizing the fetus as a person, with all rights and 
liberties espoused under the Constitution?30 
While the court seems to agree with Roe v. Wade sl and its 
reasoning that a fetus is not a person, the dicta is worrisome 
23. Crumpton, 947 F.2d at 1422. 
24. Id. at 1423. 
25. San Francisco Chron., Nov. 15, 1991, at A·15, col. 4. 
26. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113. 
27. San Francisco Chron., Nov. 15, 1991, at A·15, col. 4. 
28. Attorney Steven Yagman estimated, based on considerable research, that this 
new cause of action amounts to about 10% of all the civil rights cases that could be filed 
nationally. Phone conversation with Mr. Yagman (February 21,1992). 
29. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113. 
30. In an unrelated case involving allegations of excessive force and the rights 
of unborn children, Mr. Yagman won a $415,229 award in May 1988. His plaintiff, 
Brenda Cornwell, said a Riverside police officer punched her in the stomach when she 
was three months pregnant during a party that had become raucous. The jury did not 
award damages to the women's daughter, who was 18 months old. But the district court 
judge presiding, Ferdinand F. Fernandez, issued a tentative ruling that constitutional 
rights begin at conception.· (emphasis added) Cornwell v. City of Riverside, 896 F.2d 
398 (9th Cir.); cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 3274 (1990). 
31. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113. 
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as it may contribute to the current trend of eroding women's 
right to privacy as more courts begin to acknowledge the fetus 
as a person. The current trend is that many states do provide 
a cause of action for injury to a viable fetus, regardless of 
whether it is later born alive.32 In fact, one recent case noted 
that "[a] majority of the states allow an action for wrongful 
death of a viable fetus even when it is still born as a result of 
prenatal injuries."33 Moreover, virtually every jurisdiction, 
including California, currently allows children born to recov-
er in tort for prenatal injuries caused by third parties.84 
One commentator noted: "[t]he inclusion of fetuses in the 
group of persons protected by ... tort law is not necessarily 
inconsistent with the interests of the mother."36 Moreover, 
"judicial recognition of a child's right to recover damages for tor-
tious prenatal injury does not mean that the courts recognize 
unborn fetuses as persons with full legal rights."36 Indeed, the 
decision in Crumpton seems to suggest that they are interested 
in protecting the interests of the damaged live born person 
against third parties only, in this case, the police. As 
another commentator noted: "The courts are not compensating 
fetuses but are instead compensating children who need 
32. Crumpton, 947 F.2d. at 1423. 
33. Humes v. 'Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Kan. 1990). In Humes, the court rea-
soned that an unborn non viable fetus is not a person within the definition of the wrong-
ful death act, and therefore incapable of bringing an action on its own behalf. A viable 
fetus, on the other hand was a "person" within the meaning of the wrongful death 
statute because it was capable of an independent existence and regarded as a sepa-
rate entity." This is the position ofa majority of the states for determining standing 
for wrongful death actions against third parties. See also Hale v. Manion, 368 P.2d 1 
(Kan. 1962). 
34. International Union U.A.W. v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) 
(White, J. joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment). The right of recovery for a prenatal irijury inflicted by a third party 
now appears to be well settled principle in tort law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 869 (I) (1977). See also W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, Prosser and 
Keeton, § 55, at 368 (5th ed. 1984). 
35. Kim, Reconciling Fetal/Maternal Conflicts, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 223 (1991) 
[hereinafter Kim]. To a certain extent, laws that recognize fetal rights against third 
parties, also protect the mother from having other people interfere or harm her preg-
nancy against her will. "Holding third parties responsible for the negligent or crim-
inal destruction of fetuses is ... consistent with, and even enhances, the protection of 
pregnant women's interests." See Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with 
Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J., 
599, 603 [hereinafter Johnsen]. 
36. Nelson, Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: Compelling Each to 
Live as Seems Good to the Rest, 37 HAsTINGS L.J. 703, 733 (1986) [hereinafter Nelson]. 
See also, Glantz, Is the Fetus a PersonV A LAWYER'S VIEW, in ABORTION AND THE 
STATUS OF THE FETUS 114 (W. H. ENGELHARDT, JR., S. SPICKER & D. WINSHIP ed. 1983). 
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special medical treatment .... The point in pregnancy when 
those acts occur does not serve to deflect the courts from their 
rightful goal of compensating the injured child. "37 (emphasis 
added). 
But, this is where the danger lies: the recognition of fetal 
rights which conflicts with the mother's privacy rights. While 
the Crumpton principle does not address fetal rights per se, 
does it have the potential to be a disguise for the same poten-
tial harm -is it the wolf in sheep's clothing? Under Crumpton 
will a child now have a cause of action against hislher moth-
er based on "the right to freedom from excessive force?" And 
if so, does this ultimately conflict with women's privacy rights? 
Many argue that the recognition of some legal protections 
for the fetus does not transform the fetus into a person with full 
legal rights.38 A fetus mayor may not possess legal protections 
depending on the legal context and the social policies at stake.39 
The reasoning in Crumpton indicates that, based on the soci-
etal context and remedial nature of § 1983, the court recognized 
the importance of the constitutional right involved. By allow-
ing Crumpton to proceed with a cause of action, there is the pos-
sibility of compensaton to a child for losing a father. It is 
precisely the nature of the right involved, the rights to famil-
ial companionship and society, that forms the basis for 
Crumpton's cause of action which the court narrowly defines 
by distinguishing the rights of a fetus as compared with a 
born child. 
Despite the Court's ruling, which focused on a post-birth 
"injury," the court seems willing to allow a c.ause of action to a 
child for injuries sustained from prenatal activity while in 
utero. (emphasis added). The court challenges the reasoning 
behind Harman v. Daniels4o, which established the principle 
that a child cannot sue the police department for direct prenatal 
37. Kim, supra note 34, at 229. 
38. Johnsen, supra note 34. 
39. The legal status of the fetus should be determined largely by the purpose of 
the particular law in question, rather than by a particular philosophical view of 
fetal -personhood." For example, the legal capacity of an unborn fetus, if born alive, 
to inherit property is better understood as a way to fulfill the intentions of the testator, 
a goal of inheritance law, than as recognition offetal personhood. And in the context 
of tortious context, the law attempts to compensate the innocent victims of injury. 
Nelson, supra note 35, iii; 739·740. 
40. Harman v. Daniels, 525 F. Supp. 798 (W.D. Va. 1981). 
8
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injuries caused while in utero;n The Court notes in footnote, 
that "we have grave doubts about the Harman42 Court's propo-
sition that an infant injured in utero and later born alive sim-
ply must bear their federally cognizable affiictions without the 
hope of remedy."43 Indeed the Court recognizes "a right to 
freedom from excessive force ... "44 and seems willing to hold third 
parties liable under § 1983 for physical injuries caused to 
fetuses where there is also injury at birth. Whether the right 
to freedom from excessive force is a recognizable constitu-
tional claim, the Court does not answer. While it seems logi-
cal and even justifiable to hold third parties, such as the 
police, responsible for injuries to one's child, it is troubling in 
the context of potential liability of a mother, where the "injury" 
to the child was due to some behavior on the part of the 
mother. 
The use of tort law to hold third parties liable for injuries 
inflicted on a fetus does indeed compensate the parents. This 
is because in some cases, any injury inflicted on the fetus is nec-
essarily inflicted on the parents as well.46 The recognition of 
fetal rights, however, increases the potential conflicts between 
the women and the fetus. By allowing the fetus to have inde-
pendent rights as a "person" the law focuses upon the indi-
viduality of the fetus. And as the individuality of the fetus 
becomes increasingly recognized by the law, there is greater 
potential and justification for the assertion of fetal rights 
against the woman bearing the fetus.46 Moreover, "decisions 
recognizing this rightful goal of compensating the live-born 
child may be misinterpreted as granting a fetus broad rights 
it does not, and should not possess. "47 
41. See also, Ruiz Romero, 681 F. Supp 123 (D. Puerto Rico 1988); where a 
woman was beaten by police when she was nine months pregnant, the court held that 
the woman's child had no cause of action under 1983. As to these two decisions, the 
court notes: "Even assuming arguendo, that Harman and Ruiz Romero were correctly 
decided, a presumption we question .... " (emphasis added). Crumpton 947 F. 2d. at 1422. 
42. Harman, 525 F. Supp. at 798. 
43. Crumpton 947 F.2d at 1424, n.6. In dicta the court also noted: "We need not 
decide whether Harman was incorrectly decided." at 1423. 
44. Crumpton, 947 F. 2d at 1422. 
45. Johnsen, supra note 34, at 603. 
46. As fetuses take on more and more characteristics of personhood, women lose 
access to their bodies, to the right to privacy espoused under Roe v. Wade. "Because 
persons are sovereign, deeming the fetus to be a person, "like me" has seemed the way 
to take away women's control over it, hence over themselves." MacKinnon, "Reflections 
on Sex Equality Under Law," 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1314 (1991) [hereinafter MacKinnon]. 
47. Nelson, supra note 35, at 734. 
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While Crumpton does not explicitly address the issue offetal 
rights, the case raises serious issues about where fetal rights, 
children's rights and women's rights converge. Any legal def-
initions or redefinitions of the applicability of the principles 
behind Roe48 have the potential of eroding the constitutional 
protections Roe created: a woman's constitutional right of pri-
vacy. While the court in Crumpton clearly noted that whether 
a fetus was a person entitled to sue under § 1983 was not dis-
positive of the case, the issue of fetal rights should not be 
overlooked. As one author commented: "It is now the fetus that 
dominates the debate."49 In fact, the legal system has reached 
a stage where fetuses can be assigned counsel50 , pregnant 
women are prosecuted and jailed for prenatal negligence51 , 
and in some jurisdictions "personhood" is said to begin at con-
ception.52 Expanding the remedial purposes of § 198353 cre-
ates a potential fetal/child/maternal conflict whereby the 
woman is pitted against her fetus and child.64 
The very decision in Roe56 gave no absolute guarantees of 
a woman's right to chose. 58 In particular, a woman's constitu-
tional right to privacy is at stake when she is faced with state-
compelled medical treatment for the sake of the fetus. 57 Far 
48. Roe 410 U.S. at 113. 
49. Neff, Woman, Womb, and Bodily Integrity, 3 YALE JOURNAL OF LAW AND 
FEMINISM," 327, 330 (1991) [hereinafter Neffl. 
50. See, e.g. In re A.C., 533 A.2d 617 (D.C. App. 1987), vacated, 573 A.2d 1235 
(1990) (counsel assigned to fetus to argue necessity of forced cesarean). 
51. Cases in which a pregnant women and her fetus are constructed as adversaries 
before the state are becoming commonplace. Criminal prosecution of women for preg-
nancy-related behavior deemed harmful to the fetus, see Paltrow, When Becoming 
Pregnant is a Crime, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 41 (1990). 
52. Mo. Rev. Stat § 1.205.1(1) - .1(2) (1986). The preamble of the Missouri abor-
tion statute reads: [t]he life of each human being begins at conception .... Unborn 
children have protectable interests in life, health and well-being." 
53. See, e.g. Golden State v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 110 (1989). The 
court in Crumpton seems to articulate that a child should be compensated for a fed-
erally cognizable injuries he or she must bear. That "a contrary rule flies in the face 
of the remedial purposes ofsection 1983." Crumpton at 1424. 
54. See PETCHESKY, ROSALIND, Abortion and Women's Choice, (2d ed. 1990); also 
POLLIT, , "Fetal Rights - A New Assault on Feminism: THE NATION, March 25, 1990, 
at 409. Generally, see MacKinnon, supra note 45. As one author noted: " .. .identify-
ing itself as the 'defender of fetal rights', the state reveals its latent suspicion that a 
pregnant woman is untrustworthy irresponsible, and an adverse to her fetus." Neff, 
supra note 48, at 331. 
55. Roe 410 U.S. at 113. 
56. The court developed the trimester system whereby the interests of the 
woman would be balanced against those of the state, and its interest in protecting the 
fetus. Thus at the later time of the pregnancy, particularly at viability, the state is said 
to have "compelling" interests, whereby the state can prevent a woman from choos-
ing to have an abortion at that time. Roe V. Wade, 410 U.S. 158 (1973). 
57. Nelson, supra note 35, at 745. 
10
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from protecting women's privacy rights, the limited trimester 
analysis established by Roe68 "has permitted the state to exer-
cise increasing control. "69 Indeed, a woman's status under the 
Constitution, while in theory superior due to her "person-
hood," is melting away as the fetus looks more like a "person" 
and the courts are more willing to redress harms done to 
"infants injured in utero and later born alive .... "60 
Under Crumpton, the timing of injury, post birth, alleviates 
the necessity to confront the "amorphous and unsettled legal 
status of the fetus."61 Unfortunately, it is possible the Court did 
not completely avoid the implications of Roe v. Wade. 62 In 
particular, the potential cause of action of a child against 
hislher mother merely exacerbates the pitting of fetus against 
woman and now (possibly) child against mother. 
Maternal tort liability63 raises serious dangers as it focus-
es on the rights of the fetus, rather than the woman, as the 
party with the right of recovery in a tort claim.a. In 1980, the 
Michigan Court of Appeals held that an expectant mother 
would be held to the same standard of conduct as a third party 
tortfeasor.66 However, in Stallman v. Younquist66 , the Illinois 
Supreme Court refused to hold a mother liable for prenatal 
injuries that her child sustained in a car accident.67 
The Court realized the potential fetal rights issue raised in 
Crumpton, yet by overruling the district co~rt's decision, the 
58. Roe 410 U.S. at 113. 
59. Neff, supra note 48, at 331. • ... the right to privacy cannot be said to be 
absolute." Roe 410 U.S. at 172. Under Roe the pregnant woman is not alone and her 
rights must be weighed against the competing potential of life. 
60. Crumpton 947 F.2d at 1424, n.6. 
61. Nelson, supra note 35, at 735. 
62. Roe 410 U.S. at 113. 
63. For a more comprehensive analysis of maternal tort liability, see Beal, Can 
I Sue Mommy? An Analysis ora Woman's Tort Liability To Her Child Born Alille, 21 
SAN DIEGO L. REV 325 (1984). 
64.ld. 
65. Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W. 2d 869, 870 (1980). In Grodin, the ·reason-
ableness" of the mothers conduct in taking tetracycline while pregnant presented a 
triable issue of fact. The case represents the first case to shin the focus in a prena-
tal injury tort claim from the pregnant woman to the fetus. 
66. Stallman v. Younquist, 531 N.E. 2d 355, 359 (1988). 
67. ld. Criticizing the Grodin court for not realizing the profound implication 
of its decision, Stallman emphasized that -[a] legal duty to guarantee the mental and 
physical health of another has never before been recognized in law." The court noted 
that recognizing the fetus as an individual was a "legal fiction" that would infringe 
on women's right to privacy and bodily autonomy. The court concluded that the way 
to ensure healthy babies was not tort liability but before-the-fact education of all women 
and families about prenatal development.ld. at 361. 
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Court sidestepped the issue entirely.88 The Court focused on 
Crumpton's birth as the point of inquiry and therefore found 
him to be a "person" to assert his constitutional claim. 
Crumpton may now redress the wrongs he suffered as a result 
of the actions committed by the Los Angeles Police Department 
who allegedly killed his father. This is justice. What remains 
unclear is whether other fetuses born later will be considered 
"persons" with the right to redress the "wrongs" committed by 
their mothers? Will the state then have a compelling interest 
to assert a cause of action against the mother on behalf of the 
fetus/child? This is not justice. By not addressing Roe v 
Wade69 and failing to re-affirm the principle that a fetus is not 
a person, the Court has left the door open to provide more rights 
to fetuses, at the expense of women's rights. 
Feminist legal scholar Catherine MacKinnon recently com-
mented on the implications of fetus as "person".70 The overall 
message is strikingly poignant and applicable as one attempts 
to predict the implications of Crumpton v. Gates for women: 
N ow place the legal status of the fetus 
against the backdrop of women's tenuous 
to nonexistent equality. Women have not 
been considered "persons" by the law for 
very long; the law of persons arguably does 
not recognize the requisites of female per-
sonhood yet. Separate fetal status of any 
sort, in a male-dominated system in which 
women have been controlled through the 
control of their procreative capacity, risks 
further entrenchment of women's inequali-
ty. If the fetus were deemed a person, it may 
well have more rights than women do, espe-
cially since fetal rights would be asserted 
most often by men in traditionally male 
institutions of authority ... Fetal rights as 
such are thus in direct tension with sex 
equality rights. 71 
Carol Beth Barnett* 
68. Crumpton, 947 F.2d at 1422. 
69. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113. 
70. MacKinnon, supra note 45, at 1315. 
71. [d. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993. 
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II. CRIMINAL LAW 
A. BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 
1. Evidence of the Battered Woman Syndrome is rele-
vant to support a battered woman's claim of self-
defense. 
People v. Day, No. F014113 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1992). In 
People v. Day, the court held that evidence of the Battered 
Woman Syndrome! was relevant on the issue of whether Day 
honestly believed she needed to use deadly force in self- defense; 
it was also relevant to explain a behavior pattern that might oth-
erwise appear unreasonable to the average person. 2 
FACTS 
PROSECUTION CASE 
The prosecution presented the following facts at trial. On 
the night of June 10, 1988, appellant, Valoree Jean Day, stabbed 
Steve Brown, the man with whom she lived. At approximately 
11 p.m. that night, a neighbor in the adjacent apartment, Jan 
Fernandez, overheard an argument between Day and Brown. 
Fernandez called the building's security twice that night, to 
request that they intervene in the fight next door. Russell 
Holt, another neighbor, heard the front door of the DaylBrown 
apartment slam shut, as Brown yelled, "You don't have to lock 
me out. I have a key of my own, bitch."3 Holt then heard 
Brown's truck leave, and return five to ten minutes later. 
Just before 1 a.m. on June 11, 1988, Tuolumne County 
Deputy Sheriff Antone and Groveland Constable Jarratt 
arrived at Day's apartment. The front door was open, the 
master bedroom was locked from the inside and was missing 
the exterior knob, a chair was pushed over, and no one was in 
the apartment. The officers searched outside the apartment, 
and found Brown lying face-down with several stab wounds, at 
the west corner of the complex. 
1. Hereinafter referred to a8 BWS. 
2. People v. Day, No. F014113 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1992). 
3. 1d. at 195. 
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Brown died early that morning; the cause of death was 
stab wounds to his chest. He had four frontal wounds: a deep 
wound in his chest, a superficial wound, and two slices. He had 
a deep stab wound to his back, and superficial cuts on his fin-
gers, hips and forehead. 
At about the same time that Brown was found, Day 
appeared at the door of her friend's, Lynn Olson. Day told Olson 
that she stabbed Brown after he attacked her with a knife. 
Olson called the home of Constable Jarratt, who arrived short-
ly thereafter and took Day into custody. 
In jail, Day was examined by a nurse and the following 
injuries were discovered: bruises to Day's right upper arm, 
inner arm, forearm, and outside of the arm. The knuckles of 
both Day's hands were red and swollen, and she had a bruise 
and abrasion on her right knee. Day had a shallow abrasion 
on her right elbow. During the examination, Day was told that 
Brown had died, and she began to cry and hyperventilate; the 
nurse gave Day librium to calm her. 
Five days later, Day was examined in jail by a doctor. He 
found additional injuries including bruises on Day's chest, 
and on the triceps of her right arm. Day's left eardrum was per-
forated, she had a contusion on her right kneecap and a con-
tusion and abrasion on her right shinbone. There was also 
bruising on her rear hip. 
DEFENSE CASE 
Day testified at trial as to her version of the fight and 
stabbing on June 10, 1988, and revealed a perspective which 
differed significantly from that of the prosecution. In order to 
more fully understand the apparent discrepancies, it is help-
ful to first examine the history of Day's relationship with 
Brown. 
1. History 
At trial, Day testified that Brown began to beat her early 
in their relationship. Day attributed the beatings to Brown's 
drinking, and felt that if she stayed with him, and helped 
him, things would get better. However, over time, the frequency 
and severity of the beatings increased. 
14
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Before they moved in together, Brown tried to strangle 
Day, and in 1987 he tried to run her over with his car. Brown 
frequently went to bars, drank, and came home angry. Day 
would lock herself in the bedroom to escape Brown's violence. 
One day in the fall of 1987 Day came home without her 
keys. Brown had been drinking and would not let her in. 
When Day knocked at the back door, Brown opened it and 
began to punch her. Brown then sat on top of Day, pinned her 
arms to the ground, and banged her head against the deck. Day 
screamed to her neighbor for help, and eventually a security 
officer came and took Day to a friend's house. 
The ongoing abuse and violence notwithstanding, Day 
never filed a formal complaint against Brown. She felt that the 
officers always sided with Brown, and additionally, she hoped 
that she and Brown could resolve their problems on their own. 
During the time that Day and Brown lived together, neigh-
bors and friends saw injuries on Day including facial bruises, 
black eyes, swollen lips, and red marks and bruises on her body. 
On occasion, Day fought back,' and in one instance, a 
friend saw a bite mark on Brown's cheek. 
2. Incident 
Day testified that on the night of June 10, 1988, Brown went 
out fot: the evening. Day was in bed around 11 p.m. when she 
heard the downstairs door slam and the sound of a beer can 
opening. Brown then came upstairs and Day heard him trying 
to unlock the bedroom door. Brown said, "I'm going to kill you,"6 
and Day screamed for help. Day heard what she thought was 
a stabbing sound at the door, and then a knife blade penetrated 
through the door. 
At approximately 12:30 a.m. on June 11, Brown left the 
house, saying as he left, "Don't try and lock me out, I have 
keys."6 Day locked the front door, and grabbed a knife to pro-
tect herself. She saw cigarettes on the counter, and, fearful that 
4. The record indicates only one such specific instance, when Day hit Brown on 
the head with a tennis racquet. 
5. Day, No. F014113, slip op. at 196 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1992). 
6. [d. 
15
Barnett et al.: California Law Survey
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992
836 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:821 
Brown might use them to set the house on fire, took them 
upstairs and wet them. Day then locked herself in the master 
bedroom. 
When Brown returned he said, "I'm going to kill you, 
Valoree. I've had it with yoU."7 Day told him to leave, and that 
she had a knife to protect herself. Brown broke open the 
master bedroom door, and Day ran into the bathroom. After a 
few minutes, Brown left the bedroom. 
Day then went into the guest bedroom and put a chair 
against the door. Brown returned, and pounded on the guest 
bedroom door. Again, Day screamed to her neighbors for help. 
Brown opened the door and rushed Day with a knife. They fell 
to the floor. Brown tried to stab Day but missed. "The next 
thing [Day] knew, Brown was hurt."8 
Day did not realize the gravity of Brown's injuries, and was 
afraid he would return to renew the attack. She quickly left 
the apartment, and when she realized she still had the knife 
in her hand, she dropped it. Day made sure Brown was not 
near her car, and drove to Lynn Olson's house. 
COURT'S ANALYSIS 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Day was tried by a jury, and convicted of involuntary 
manslaughter, and assault with a deadly weapon. After her 
conviction, Day obtained new counsel, and moved for a new 
trial. Day argued that her assistance of counsel was ineffective 
because her attorney made no effort to investigate or present 
evidence of the BWS. The trial court agreed that Day's coun-
sel was deficient, but concluded that Day had not been preju-
diced, and denied her motion for a new trial. 
Day argued that the trial court erred in finding no preju-
dice. She claimed that evidence of the BWS was admissible to 
prove the objective reasonableness of her use of deadly force in 
self-defense, and to rehabilitate her in light of the prosecution's 
assertion that her conduct, both before and after the incident, 
was not consistent with having acted in self-defense. 
7.Id. 
8. Id. at 196·97. The facts do not clearly indicate how Brown received the fatal 
wounds. 
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EXTRALEGAL FACTORS 
In support of her motion for a new trial, Day filed several 
affidavits which the appellate court used to analyze Day's 
claims of error. 
Day's trial counsel filed an affidavit and admitted that he 
knew nothing about BWS, and that he never considered 
researching or presenting evidence on Day's behalf regarding 
BWS. He further acknowledged that if he were to try the 
case again, he would present such evidence. 
M. Gerald Schwartzbach, a legal expert witness, submitted 
an affidavit which stated that in 1981 he used the expert wit-
ness testimony of psychologist Dr. Lenore E. Walkers to obtain 
an acquittal for his client charged with homicide on the grounds 
of self-defense. 10 
Dr. Lee H. Bowker,l1 an authority on BWS, submitted an 
affidavit in which he concluded, based on an in-depth interview 
with Day, and on materials presented by Day's attorney, that 
Day suffered from BWS. Although Day occasionally defended 
herself against Brown's attacks, she was no less a battered 
woman. Dr. Bowker stated that, "[t]wo of the personal strate-
gies commonly employed by battered women are flight and 
active self-defense, more commonly known as counter-vio-
lence."12 
Pat Cervelli, a counselor with extensive experience in the 
domestic violence field, also filed an affidavit in which she con-
cluded that Day suffered from the BWS. Ms. Cervelli stated 
that it is common for a battered woman to forget and to min-
imize the severity of the beatings she receives, which enables 
her to stay in a very dangerous situation. Ms. Cervelli listed 
some of the reasons a woman stays in a battering relationship, 
which include loving the batterer, and hoping or believing the 
violence will end. IS Additionally, a battered woman typically 
feels her batterer is far more powerful and strong than he 
9. Dr. Lenore E. Walker is an authority on BWS. Two of her books include: 
LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979); LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED 
WOMAN SYNDROME (1984). 
10. Day, No. F014113, slip op. at 197 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1992). 
11. Dr. Lee H. Bowker is a psychologist and Dean of Behavioral and Social 
Sciences at Humboldt State University. 
12. Day, No. F014113, slip op. at 197 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1992). 
13. 1d. 
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actually is, which reinforces her sense of helplessness and 
futility. Ms. Cervelli explained that a "perception of a lack of 
protection by law enforcement (or by anyone else) is part of the 
BWS. Attempts to stop the violence usually fail, because the 
battered woman has a belief that it is useless, a previous 
experience with law enforcement officials that was 
unsupportive, fear of retaliation by the batterer, and lastly, fear 
ofloss of the relationship. "14 Finally, although she may have 
difficulty leaving the relationship, or seeking outside help, a 
battered woman often does fight back. Ms. Cervelli explained 
that "what defines a woman as being 'battered' is the fact 
that she is the victim of violence perpetrated by her partner, 
and that she remains in the relationship after repeated violent 
incidents. She if [sic] often angry and often hits back. "16 
OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS OR SUBJECTIVE HONESTY 
The court first assessed Day's claim that evidence of the 
BWS was admissible to prove the objective reasonableness of 
her use of deadly force l6 in self defense. The court cited with 
approval People v. Aris17 which held that "expert testimony 
about a defendant's state of mind is not relevant to the rea-
sonableness of the defendant's self-defense. "18 However, the 
Aris court concluded that evidence ofBWS is relevant to prove 
that the defendant honestly believed that deadly force was nec-
essary to defend herself. 19 Similarly, the court in Day held 
that evidence of the BWS was relevant to prove Day's honest 
belief that she had to use deadly force to defend herself,20 
although it was not relevant to show that she acted as would 
a reasonable person in similar circumstances.21 
14. 1d. 
15. 1d. at 198, quoting Gelles, Straus, 1987. 
16. Justifiable homicide, as defined by the California Penal Code, requires that 
the person exercising self-defense have a "reasonable ground to apprehend a design 
to do ... great bodily injury, and ... must really and in good faith have endeavored to 
decline any further struggle before the homicide was committed .... • Cal. Penal Code 
§ 197 (3) (West 1988). Courts have interpreted this standard as requiring a double 
showing: first, the defendant must actually have been in fear of his or her life, or of 
serious bodily injury; and second, the conduct of the other party must have been such 
as to produce that state of mind in a reasonable person. People v. Sonier, 113 Cal. App. 
2d 277, 278, 248 P.2d 155, 156 (1952). 
17. People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1989). 
18. Day, No. F014113, slip op. at 198 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1992), citing Aris, 215 
Cal. App. 3d at 1196, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 179. 
19. Day, No. F014113, slip op. at 198 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6,1992), citingAris, 215 
Cal. App 3d at 1199, 264 Cal Rptr. at 181. 
20. 1d. at 200. 
21. 1d. at 198. 
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REHABILITATION OF WITNESS CREDIBILITY 
Day's second claim was that evidence of the BWS was 
admissible to show that her conduct was consistent with self-
defense. The court held that evidence of the BWS was 
admissible for this purpose, and cited as authority, People v. 
McAlpin. 22 
In McAlpin, the Supreme Court held that expert testimony 
on the common reactions of child molestation victims "is admis-
sible to rehabilitate such witness's credibility when the defen-
dant suggests that the child's conduct after the incident...is 
inconsistent with his or her testimony claiming molestation."23 
The McAlpin court analogized expert testimony on "child sex-
ual abuse accommodation syndrome" to expert testimony on 
rape trauma syndromeu previously held admissible in People 
v. Bledsoe. 26 The McAlpin court explained that this expert tes-
timony is necessary "to disabuse jurors of commonly held mis-
conceptions about child sexual abuse, and to explain the 
emotional antecedents of abused children's seemingly self-
impeaching behavior. "26 
The court in Day concluded that the reasoning of McAlpin21 
applied equally to the battered woman context. Evidence of 
the BWS would have helped to counter the prosecutor's chal-
lenge to Day's credibility, and to dispel many of the com-
monly held misconceptions about battered women which the 
prosecutor exploited, and which defense counsel failed to 
rebut. 
22. People v. McAlpin, 53 Cal. 3d 1289, 812 P.2d 563, 283 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1991). 
23. Day, No. F014113, slip op. at 199 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6,1992), citing McAlpin, 
53 Cal. 3d at 1300, 812 P.2d at 569, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 388. 
24. 53 Cal. 3d at 1300, 812 P.2d at 569, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 388. 
25. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984). 
In Bledsoe, the court held that expert testimony was inadmissible to prove that the 
complaining witness in a rape case had in fact been raped. 36 Cal. 3d at 251,681 
P.2d at 301,203 Cal. Rptr. at 460. However, the court distinguished expert testi· 
mony presented in order to rehabilitate the complaining witness after the defendant 
had impeached her credibility by suggesting that her conduct after the incident was 
inconsistent with having been raped. The court reasoned that expert testimony on 
rape trauma syndrome was useful to disabuse the jury of widely held misconceptions 
about rape and rape victims, so that it could evaluate the evidence free of the con· 
straints of popular myths. 36 Cal. 3d at 247·48, 681 P.2d at 298,203 Cal. Rptr. at 
457. 
26. 53 Cal. 3d at 1301,812 P.2d at 569, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 388. 
27. [d. 
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First, the prosecutor at trial argued that Day and Brown 
were engaged in "mutual combat," and even defense counsel 
characterized their relationship as one of "mutual combat." The 
appellate court reasoned that expert testimony would have "dis-
abused the jury of the notion that because a woman strikes back 
at her batterer, she is engaging in "mutual combat. "38 The court 
cited Commonwealth v. Stonehouse29 and Dr. Bowker's affi-
davit30 as support for the proposition that it is not uncommon 
for a battered woman to resort to counter-violence.31 The 
Stonehouse court reasoned that a woman who attempts to 
defend herself against her batterer is no less a battered woman 
"in that her attempts do not stop the repeated episodes of 
physical and emotional abuse. "32 
Second, the prosecutor at trial argued that if Day were 
being beaten by Brown, she could have left him. Due to defense 
counsel's ignorance of the BWS, he presented no evidence to 
counter this myth, nor did he present any argument to explain 
why Day did not leave Brown. The appellate court cited State 
v. Hodges33 for the proposition that "expert testimony on the 
[BWS] would help dispel the ordinary lay person's perception 
that a woman in a battering relationship is free to leave at any 
time."34 
Finally, the prosecutor argued that Day's flight after stab-
bing Brown evidenced a consciousness of guilt. Defense coun-
sel failed to offer any alternative explanation for Day's flight. 
Referring to Day's motion for a new trial,36 the appellate court 
stated that evidence of the BWS would have explained that 
some women do not realize they are safe even after the abus-
er is dead or injured, and that they take further protective mea-
sures against the retaliation they expect to follow an aggressive 
attack. 
The appellate court concluded that Day was prejudiced by 
counsel's failure to present evidence of the BWS, because there 
28. Day, No. F014113, slip op. at 199 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1992). 
29. Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 521 Pa. 41, 555 A.2d 772 (1989). 
30. Day, No. F014113, slip op. at 197 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1992). 
31. [d. at 199, citIng Stonehouse 555 A. 2d at 784. 
32. Day, No. F014113, slip op. at 199 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1992), citing 
Stonehouse, 555 A. 2d at 784, n.10. 
33. State v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563, 239 Kan. 63 (1986), disapproved on other 
grounds in State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 579, 243 Kan. 639 (1988). 
34. Hodges, 716 P.2d at 579. 
35. Day, No. F014113, slip op. at 199 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1992). 
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was a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unpro-
fessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. "38 Counsel's lack of knowledge of the BWS left him 
unable to counter the prosecutor's claim that Day's conduct was 
inconsistent with self-defense, and it left him equally unable 
to counter the myths about battered women upon which the 
prosecutor built his case. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts are now beginning to recognize the BWS as a legit-
imate theory ofself-defense.37 Implicit in this recognition is an 
acknowledgement that the social and psychological factors 
that comprise the BWS are important to legal analysis. When 
the BWS is applied to the facts of a given case, what was for-
merly a more traditional rights-based analysis moves away 
from rigidly defined rules and becomes necessarily more con-
textual. The court in Day compared different characteristics 
of the prototypical battered woman, as defined by the BWS, 
with Day's specific conduct both preceding and following the 
stabbing of Brown. This analysis led the court to conclude that 
Day's actions were consistent with those of a battered woman, 
and that Day did honestly believe that she needed to use dead-
ly force to defend herself. This case clearly demonstrates the 
importance of teaching practitioners to analyze the legal and 
factual issues of any case, in light of relevant psychological and 
sociological factors. To fail to do so is to fail to adequately rep-
resent a client. 
Heather Allyson Elrick* 
36. [d. at 200, citing In re Sixto, 48 Cal. 3d 1247, 1257, 774 P.2d 164, 169,259 
Cal. Rptr. 491, 496 (1989). 
37. Day, No. F014113, slip op. at 195 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 6,1992); State v. Kelly, 
97 N.J. 178,478 A.2d 364 (1984). 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993. 
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III. EMPLOYMENT LAW 
A. SEX DISCRIMINATION 
1. A policy of excluding women from employment because 
they are fertile is unlawful discrimination. 
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous. 
Comm'n, 218 Cal. App. 3d 517, 267 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1990), cert. 
denied. In Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Fair Employment and 
Housing Commission, the California Court of Appeal struck 
down the Fetal Protection Program (FPP) instituted by Johnson 
Controls and exposed it as a clear case of wrongful discrimina-
tion. The Court noted that Johnson Controls' policy did not 
seek to educate women about the risks oflead exposure to fetus-
es or remove those risks, but rather sought to remove from 
women "the opportunity to make any choices in the matter at all."1 
The Court held the FPP to be unlawful discrimination based on 
sex, as it prevented fertile women from engaging in specific 
areas of employment. 
Ms. Foster, "a young, physically able woman seeking and 
needing employment"2, applied for ajob at Globe Battery, a divi-
sion of Johnson Controls. Ms. Foster was unaware that the job 
she sought was subject to female exclusion. Johnson Controls' 
FPP prevented women of child bearing capacity from working 
in areas of the battery plant that were exposed to high levels 
of lead. The FPP required documentation of infertility as a pre-
requisite to employment only for women.3 
After having been denied the job because of her refusal to 
produce medical evidence of infertility, Ms. Foster filed a com-
plaint with the Fair Employment and Housing Commission 
(Commission). The Commission investigated her complaint 
and found that "[Johnson Controls'] hiring practices were 
1. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n. 218 Cal. App. 
3d 517,551,267 Cal. Rptr. 158, 178 (1990). 
2. [d. at 525. 267 Cal. Rptr. at 160. 
3. Johnson Controls, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 533, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 166. The 
Company's policy claims only to be directed at women of child bearing capacity. but 
it is actually directed at "all women except those whose inability to bear children is 
medically documented.· [d. (emphasis added). 
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discriminatory on the basis of sex [and] that the FPP was not 
based upon a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).'" 
The Commission ordered Johnson Controls to hire Ms. Foster 
and to discontinue its FPP.6 
The subject of fetal protection programs is neither of first 
impression for the courts nor for Johnson Controls. The United 
Auto Workers sued Johnson Controls on a similar complaint 
which led to a finding of unlawful discrimination by the United 
States Supreme Court: "sex-specific fetal protection policies 
[are] unlawful in light of Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964], as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act."6 In 
this case, the California Court of Appeal relied on the Fair 
Employment and Housing Act (Act) as its authority.7 The Act 
provides that employment discrimination based on sex is 
unlawful "unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation."8 "The BFOQ defense ... has two components: First, the 
employer must demonstrate that the occupational qualification 
is 'reasonably necessary to the normal operation of [the] par-
ticular business'. Secondly, the employer must show that the 
categorical exclusion based on protected class characteristic is 
. t'fi d "9 JUs I Ie .... 
The availability of the BFOQ defense "was in fact meant to 
be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of 
discrimination based on sex."tO The applicability of the BFOQ 
is dependent on women's ability to perform the job in question: 
4. Id. at 526, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 161. 
5.ld. 
6. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991). Title 
VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982), prohibits employment discrimination based 
on race, sex, religion or national origin. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 
is an llmendment to Title VII that explicitly holds discrimination based on pregnan-
cy or the ability to become pregnant in violation of Title VII. 
7. Johnson Controls, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 532, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 164. The court 
applied the standards of the Fair Employment and Housing Act used by the 
Commission in reviewing the Commission's finding of overt discrimination. Id. at 530, 
267 Cal. Rptr. at 164. The Commission, in construing the California statute, is nei-
ther bound to consider nor follow Federal law. Id. at 540, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 170. 
8. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12940 (West 1980). 
9. Johnson Controls, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 540, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 170 (citing 
Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). 
10. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977). This was the first case to 
construe the BFOQ. The case involved a woman seeking employment as a counselor 
in a maximum-security male prison in Alabama. The Court found that "[a] woman's 
relative ability to maintain order in a male, maximum-security, unclassified peni-
tentiary could be directly reduced by her womanhood." Id. at 335. As a result of the 
relationship between the ability to perform the job and the gender of the applicant, 
the court found this case to fall within the narrow exception of the BFOQ. 
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"the BFOQ exception will not justify the exclusion of all women 
from employment unless the employer shows that a male sex-
ual characteristic is 'crucial to the successful performance of 
the job' involved."11 Based on the information presented, the 
Court stated that "the foregoing evidence and evidentiary 
paucity supports the factual conclusion that the exclusion of fer-
tile women only from the battery factory workplace is a facial, 
blatant, overt gender-based job discrimination ... unless war-
ranted by a BFOQ."12 
The Court then concluded that "the facts do not satisfy 
the BFOQ test. "13 There was "no evidence that fertile women 
cannot efficiently perform jobs involving contact with lead at 
the [Johnson Controls] facility."14 In addition, the risk of fetal 
harm did not justify the program as "there was no evidence of 
any harm to a single child. "16 Johnson Controls did not demon-
strate acceptable reasons for excluding fertile women from 
battery production, therefore, it was unable to satisfy the 
BFOQ exception. 
Johnson Controls also raised another defense to employ-
ment discrimination based on sex called the Business Necessity 
Defense (BND). The BND arises under the "'disparate impact' 
theory in which an employer institutes a policy that appears 
neutral on its face but discriminates in effect against certain 
employees on the basis of their race, sex, or religion. "16 The 
BND cannot be used in this case, as it is "concerned with 
facially neutral rules, standards and criteria, rather than 
with class-based exclusion."17 The policy applied in this case 
11. Howard, Hazardous Substances in the Workplace: Implications for the 
Employment Rights of Women, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 798, n.3 (1981)(citing Rosenfeld v. 
Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1971». In Rosenfeld, a woman sought 
the position of agent·telegrapher at a railroad company. The Court held that there 
was no basis for the BFOQ, as the company did not contend that "the sexual 
characteristics of the employee are crucial to the job." Id. Strenuous physical demands 
of a job are not enough to prevent women from employment: "the company attempts 
to raise a commonly accepted characterization of women as the 'weaker sex' to the level 
of a BFOQ." Id. Rosenfeld emphasizes the extremely high standard of the BFOQ. 
12. Johnson Controls, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 539, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 169. 
13. Id. at 542,267 Cal. Rptr. at 171. 
14. Id. The Court further emphasized this point by stating that the ·'essence' of 
the business operation - making automotive batteries - would not be undermined". 
Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Note, Fetal Protection Policies: A Statutory Proposal in the Wake of 
International Union UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1110, 1114 
(1990). 
17. Johnson Controls, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 541, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 171. 
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was aimed directly at women, hence it was not facially neutral; 
therefore, the BND was not available. 
In analyzing the two defenses used by Johnson Controls in 
support of its fetal protection program, the Court found defi-
ciencies and inconsistencies. The Court first examined the 
standards for control oflead exposure in a work environment 
adopted by the Federal Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA). Those standards neither differenti-
ate between safe levels for men and women, nor exclude fertile 
women from jobs including lead exposure!S Instead, OSHA 
warns that both men and women who plan to have children 
should keep their lead levels below a specified level. 19 
Consequently, divergent policies for men and women in terms 
of fetal protection is not justified.20 By ignoring the proven 
impact of health risks to men and their future offspring, 
Johnson Controls' supposed interest in fetal protection is 
exposed as sex discrimination. 
Johnson Controls' supposed concern for fetal protection 
was further weakened by the lack of scientific evidence estab-
lished by Johnson Controls to support their claim of fetal dan-
ger: "The company's expert Dr. Culver admitted there were no 
recent studies that showed birth defects from lead exposure of 
a mother."21 Johnson Controls neither tracked the pregnancies 
nor documented effects on the infants of those workers who did 
become pregnant while exposed to high lead levels at the 
plant.22 Indeed, "[t]he company's experts were unable to iden-
tify or quantify the harm the FPP was supposed to remedy."23 
Johnson Controls' argument of genuine concern for the fetus, 
therefore, was severely undermined by this "total lack of 
18. [d. at 528, 267 Cal. Rptr. at.162. 
19. [d. The Court cites the Commission's finding number 12: the Federal OSHA 
lead standard states that "both males and females exposed to lead who wish to plan 
pregnancies should keep their lead levels below 30ug/100ml because of possible 
adverse effects to the fetus." [d. It is therefore clear that males are also affected by 
high levels of lead. 
20. [d. at 536, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 167. 
21. [d. at 537,267 Cal. Rptr. at 168. Based on the expert testimony during the 
trial, the Court found that the "Company's policy is based on speculation (extrapo. 
lations) about the fetus and lead exposure, assumptions that lack sound scientific sup· 
port." Dr. Fishburn, one of the Company's expert witnesses, stated that he had seen 
thousands of battery workers and could only think of one case in which a fetus suf-
fered from lead exposure. Even in this sole case, however, there was no follow-up to 
determine whether the effect (hyperactivity of the child) was permanent. [d. 
22. [d. at 529, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 163. 
23. [d. at 537, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 168. 
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evidence of harm to any fetus in [Johnson Controls'] 
experience. "24 
Johnson Controls attempted to cloak discrimination against 
women in the supposed "objective differences" between men and 
women26 ; in particular, the ability to become pregnant. The 
Court, in its dicta, found that Johnson Controls based its 
arguments on "unfounded assumptions about women"26 includ-
ing: that all women are sexually active, that those who are, are 
involved with fertile men, that those who are involved with fer-
tile men cannot be trusted to use birth control, and that women 
are incapable of making decisions regarding an unexpected 
pregnancy in a hazardous worksite. 27 The Court then con-
demned the overarching assumption which seems to have 
fueled the FPP, and Johnson Controls' discrimination against 
women: "[Johnson Controls'] policy is predicated upon the 
presumption that the employer is better suited to safeguard the 
interest of a woman's future offspring, should there be an 
unexpected pregnancy, than is the woman herself. "26 The 
Court recognized the inherent contradictions found within 
Johnson Controls' FPP, and confronted the hidden agenda of 
this policy: " ... [Johnson Controls] may not effectuate their 
goals ... at the expense of a woman's ability to obtain work for 
which she is otherwise qualified. "29 
It has been noted that "historically, an effective means for 
employers, legislatures, and courts to limit the equal employ-
ment opportunities of women was to restrict their employ-
ment out of a professed concern for the health of women and 
their offspring. "30 At first glance, the FPP appears only to be 
another example of a paternalistic policy that dictates what is 
'best' for women and their offspring. In actuality, Johnson 
Controls is also attempting to prevent women from engaging 
in certain types of employment. It is not uncommon for fetal 
protection programs to predominate in traditionally male 
domains: "The scope of [fetal protection] policies is influenced 
by the sexual composition of the work force. When the work 
24. 1d. at 538, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 169. 
25. 1d. at 551,267 Cal. Rptr. at 177. 
26. 1d. at 550,267 Cal. Rptr. at 177. 
27.1d. 
28. 1d. at 551,267 Cal. Rptr. at 177-78. 
29. 1d. at 552, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 178. 
30. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (llth Cir. 1984). 
26
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss3/9
1992] SURVEY: WOMEN AND CALIFORNIA LAW 847 
force is predominantly male, some employers exclude all fer-
tile women from hazardous jobs. When the work force is pre-
dominantly female, some employers exclude only pregnant 
women from hazardous jobs."31 The effort to restrict women's 
employment opportunities at Johnson Controls is evidenced by 
the fact that "both at the time of [Ms. Foster's] application and 
at the time of hearing, no women were employed [in the posi-
tion Ms. Foster sought] at [Johnson Controls'] Fullerton 
plant. "32 The Court was not deceived by the supposed altruism 
of the FPP, but instead saw through to Johnson Controls' ulte-
rior motive of employment discrimination. 
By failing to monitor the children born of women who 
worked in the plant during and prior to pregnancy, and failing 
to conduct adequate research on the subject in general, Johnson 
Controls was not advocating better care for a woman's fetus, 
but rather was instituting a policy which denied women fair 
employment and opportunities. An honest Fetal Protection 
Program, concerned about protecting workers and their chil-
dren, would provide a safe work environment and would ensure 
the future good health of the offspring of both male and female 
employees. 
Both the Court's ruling and its powerful, reprimanding dicta 
send a clear message to California employers seeking to implement 
an FPP. This case emphasizes the importance of recognizing 
women's ability to make intelligent, personal choices regarding 
their health and the health of their potential offspring, and the 
dange17 of placing that power in others' hands. The decision in 
Johnson Controls also sends a strong message to employers that 
society and the courts will not accept disguised excuses for dis-
crimination. This case is a critical step in the eradication of 
employment discrimination in all its forms. 
Julie Hammel Brook* 
31. Becker, From Muller II. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1219, 1239 (1986). 
32. Johnson Controls, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 529, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 163. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993. 
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B. SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
1. Sexual harassment and discrimination claims in 
employment may be brought under both the Fair 
Employment and Housing Act and the common law 
either sequentially or simultaneously. 
Raja v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130, 
801 P.2d 373 (1990). In Raja v. Kliger, the California Supreme 
Court held that a victim of sexual harassment and discrimi-
nation in employment need not file a statutory claim under the 
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) before filing a 
common law claim in civil court.1 The Court also held that "sex 
discrimination in employment may support a claim of tor-
tious discharge."2 
I. FACTS 
Plaintiffs, Emma Rojo and Teresa Maloney, were both 
employed by the defendant, Dr. Erwin Kliger, as assistants. 
Both women were "subjected by defendant to sexually harass-
ing remarks and demands for sexual favors which ultimately 
forced them to leave their employment."3 
Ms. Rojo and Ms. Maloney filed a complaint against Dr. 
Kliger for violations of FEHA and for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. At the trial court, Dr. Kliger successfully 
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the "FEHA 
constituted plaintiffs' exclusive remedy and that plaintiffs 
had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under 
the act.'" Ms. Rojo and Ms. Maloney had opposed the motion 
by arguing that the FEHA "does not sup'plant other state law 
remedies" and "pursuit of the administrative remedy is not a 
condition precedent to judicial relief."6 In addition to 
1. Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d 65, 70, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130, 132, 801 P.2d 373, 375 
(1990). For a discussion of tort causes of action available to victims of sexual harass-
ment, see Note, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Practitioner's Guide to Tort 
Actions, 10 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 879 (1980). 
2. Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d at 70, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 132, 801 P.2d at 375. 
3. Id. at 71, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 132, 801 P.2d at 375. The specific allegations includ-
ed, among others: touching Ms. Rojo's breasts and french-kissing her; forcibly grab-
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responding to the defendant's motion, the plaintiffs also request-
ed leave to amend their complaint in order to assert addition-
al causes of action, including assault and battery and tortious 
discharge in contravention of public policy.8 The Court of 
Appeal reversed the trial court's decision and held that the 
plaintiffs could seek state common law remedies without first 
exhausting remedies under FEHA. The Court of Appeal also 
ruled that "plaintiffs' allegations of sexual harassment and 
discrimination could support a claim of tortious discharge in con-
travention of public policy."7 The California Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal. 
II. FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ACT (FEHA) 
The FEHA, created in 1980 by the merging of the 
California Fair Employment Practices Act with the Rumford 
Fair Housing Act, "establishes that freedom from job dis-
crimination on specified grounds, including sex, is a civil 
right ... such discrimination is against public policy and an 
unlawful employment practice."8 The FEHA consists of two 
administrative bodies, one that investigates and prosecutes 
and the other that hears and decides claims.9 The complaint 
process of the FEHA is inhibiting to some employees because 
they must contact one of only eleven offices in California, "be 
interviewed by a non-lawyer who decides whether the employ-
ee appears to have a valid claim ... [and] be able to prove the 
discrimination case .... "10 The potential difficulty of this pro-
cess explains why some women would choose to pursue judi-
cial remedies instead. 
6. Id. 
7.Id. 
8. Id. at 72, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 133,801 P.2d at 376 (citing Commodore Home Sys., 
Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 211, 213,185 Cal. Rptr. 270, 271, 649 P.2d 912, 913 
(1982). The broad goal of the FEHA, set out in the California Government Code § 
12920, is to protect the right and opportunity for all to "seek, obtain, and hold employ-
ment without discrimination .... • CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12920 (Deering 1982). 
9. Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal 3d. at 72, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 133, 801 P.2d at 376. The 
Department receives complaints and investigates them. If a claim is deemed valid, 
the Department attempts to resolve the matter. If private resolution is ineffective 
or inappropriate, the Department may issue an accusation and act as prosecutor before 
the Commission which hears the claim. If either no accusation is issued within 150 
days of filing the complaint, or the Department decides not to prosecute, the 
Department must issue a "right to sue· letter which allows a complainant to bring a 
civil suit. Id. For further discussion of this process, See Oppenheimer, Employment 
Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge: Does the California Fair Employment and 
Housing Act Displace Common Law Remedies? 23 U.S.F. L. REV. 145,155-58 (1989). 
10. Oppenheimer, supra note 9, at 156-57. 
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Under FEHA, sexual harassment is an unlawful employ-
ment practice separate from discrimination, however, "the 
regulations and Commission decisions recognize that sexual 
harassment is a form of sex discrimination in employment. "11 
Specifically, the Fair Employment and Housing Commission 
has stated that sexual harassment "deprives its victim of a dis-
crimination-free work environment ... when the harassment 
creates an intimidating, oppressive, hostile or offensive work 
environment .... "12 Ms. Rojo and Ms. Maloney were clearly 
subjected to such an environment. As a result of the extreme 
nature of the harassment that they endured, Ms. Rojo and Ms. 
Maloney were victims of sex discrimination. 
III. THE FEHA DOES NOT PREEMPT OR PRECLUDE 
OTHER STATE LAW CLAIMS RELATING TO EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION. 
The Court found that the FEHA was not intended to pre-
empt other state laws relating to employment discrimination, 
but rather, the Legislature intended to "amplify, not abro-
gate, an employee's common law remedies for injuries relating 
to employment discrimination. "13 The Court found that both the 
statutory language and its prior decisions establish that the 
FEHA was intended to supplement other state law remedies, 
and that the defendant's arguments to the contrary are unper-
suasive. I. The FEHA expressly states that "nothing contained 
in this part shall be deemed to repeal any of the provisions of 
the Civil Rights Law or any other law of this state relating to 
discrimination [based on sex]. "16 The Court also pointed to case 
law in which it has been held that "both administrative and 
judicial remedies are available to victims of employment dis-
crimination. "16 The FEHA has widened the scope of actions a 
11. Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d at 73, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 133·34, SOl P.2d at 376-77. 
12.Id. 
13. Id. at 75, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 135, SOl P.2d at 37S. 
14. Id. 
15. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12993(a) (Deering 19S2). In addition, the court found that 
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12993(c), which states that the FEHA is intended to "occupy the 
field" of regulation of employment discrimination, indicates only an intention to pre-
empt local laws, but not to displace state laws. Rojo u. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d at 7S, 276 Cal. 
Rptr. at 137, SOl P.2d at 3S0. 
16. Rojo v. Kliger, 52 Cal. 3d at 74, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 135, SOl P.2d at 37S. As 
an example of caselaw, the Court cites Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous. 
Comm'n, 43 Cal. 3d 1379, 241 Cal. Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323 (19S7). This case held that 
although punitive damages may not be awarded under the FEHA, a complainant can 
seek punitive damages in a separate civil action alleging tort causes of action either 
with or without a FEHA claim. Id. 
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victim of sexual discrimination and harassment in employment 
may pursue, not contracted it as the defendant asserts. 
IV. EXHAUSTION OF FEHA ADMINISTRATIVE REME-
DIES IS NOT A PREREQUISITE TO PURSUIT OF OTHER 
REMEDIES. 
The Court emphasized a distinction between pursuing a 
civil suit based on a statutory claim and a civil suit based on 
a common law claim. Agreeing in part with Dr. Kliger's motion, 
the Court found that "exhaustion of the FEHA administrative 
remedy is a precondition to bringing a civil suit on a statu-
tory cause of action."17 However, the Court found that there is 
no exhaustion requirement before filing "a civil action for 
damages alleging non-statutory causes of action."18 
In making this distinction, the court examined the goals of 
the exhaustion requirement and found that the interests 
served by the requirement do not apply in this case. Ie The inter-
ests of the exhaustion requirement are not served in the 
employment discrimination context because "these are not 
cases having such a paramount need for specialized agency fact-
finding expertise .... "2o Unlike other issues in which an admin-
istrative agency has particular expertise, FEHA does not have 
a special ability to administer and regulate the employer-
employee relationship and to assess and prevent discrimination 
and related wrongs in the workplace; 21 In addition, the factu-
al issues in an employment discrimination case are neither 
too complex nor too technical for the judicial system to handle.22 
V. SEXUAL HARASSMENT MAY GIVE RISE TO A CAUSE 
OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION 
OF PUBLIC POLICY. 
Ms. Rojo and Ms. Maloney assert that both their refusal to 
tolerate the sexual harassment and their failure to acquiesce 
in the sexual demands of their employer resulted in their 
17. [d. at 83, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 141, 801 P.2d at 384 (original emphasis). 
18. [d. at 88, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 144, 801 P.2d at 387. 
19. [d. at 86,276 Cal. Rptr. at 143, 801 P.2d at 386. The interests served by the 
exhaustion requirement include: "bolstering administrative autonomy; permitting the 
agency to resolve factual issues, apply its expertise and exercise statutorily delegated 
remedies; mitigating damages; and promoting judicial economy.- [d. 




Barnett et al.: California Law Survey
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992
852 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:821 
wrongful discharges.2S Ms. Rojo and Ms. Maloney claim that 
under the California Constitution there is "a fundamental pub-
lic policy against sex discrimination in the workplace .... "24 The 
Court denied defendant's contention that the constitutional pro-
vision applies only to state action and found instead that it cov-
ers private employers as well.26 The Court then explained that in 
order to find a violation of public policy, "the policy must be 
'fundamental' and 'public' in nature. "26 Public policy has been fur-
ther defined as a policy that "inures to the benefit of the public 
at large rather than to a particular employer or employee."27 
The Court found that the policy against sex discrimination and 
sexual harassment is both public and fundamental: "so long as 
it exists, we are all demeaned. "26 The Court held that Ms. Rojo and 
Ms. Maloney could base a claim of tortious discharge in contra-
vention of public policy on sex discrimination in employment. 29 
VI. CONCLUSION 
With this decision, the California Supreme Court has sup-
ported and underscored the breadth of forums and remedies 
available to victims of sexual harassment and discrimination 
in employment. Women subjected to sexual harassment can 
seek common law remedies without having to first exhaust 
their remedies under FEHA; the FEHA remedies are in addi-
tion to, not instead of, other common law remedies. This sig-
nificant decision has empowered the victims of sexual 
harassment and discrimination in employment. Hopefully, 
"[i]nvolvement of the legal system in the [sexual harassment 
problem] is one step towards the elimination of sexual harass-
ment. "30 When forcibly subjected to harassment and discrim-
ination, Ms. Rojo and Ms. Maloney were denied the freedom of 
choice; now, the choice of forum and remedy is all theirs. 
Julie Hammel Brook* 
23. [d. at 89, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 145, 801 P.2d at 388. Ms. Maloney was discharged 
and Ms. Rojo was constructively discharged. [d. 
24. [d. The California Constitution in Article I, section 8, provides that: "A per-
son may not be disqualified from entering or pursuing a business, profession, voca-
tion, or employment because of sex, race, creed, color, or natural or ethnic origin.- CAL. 
CONST. art. I, § 8. 
25. [d. 
26. [d. (citing Foley v.lnteractive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 
765 P.2d 373 (1988». 
27. [d. 
28. [d. 
29. [d. at 71, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 132, 801 P.2d at 375. 
30. Note, supra note 1, at 928. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993. 
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C. RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
1. Department store violated job applicant's right to pri-
vacy because it failed to demonstrate a compelling 
interest in administering personality test. 
Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 235 Cal. App. 3d 654, 1 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 77 (1991). In Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp.l, the 
plaintiffs sought to enjoin Target Stores from their practice of 
administering a psychological screening test to job applicants 
for security officer positions2• In reversing the trial court's 
denial of injunctive relief, the California Court of Appeal, 
First District held that the California Constitution confers 
an inalienable right to privacy on job applicants and employ-
ees alike3 • It further held that an employer must demonstrate 
a compelling interest in order to overcome the employee's or 
applicant's right to privacy'. More significantly for the purposes 
of this note, the Soroka court explicitly held that the California 
Labor Code prohibits both private and public employers from 
discriminating against job applicants and employees on the 
basis of sexual orientation6• 
I. BACKGROUND 
The plaintiffs, in their prayer for injunctive relief, con-
tended that Target violated their constitutional and statuto-
ry right to privacy when it forced them to respond to questions 
regarding religious attitudes and sexual orientation as a pre-
requisite to job considerations. The trial court denied the 
motion for the preliminary injunction because it did not find 
the questions regarding religious attitudes and sexual orien-
tation to be unjustifiably intrusive7• Thus, the court was not 
persuaded that the plaintiffs would prevail at a trial on the 
merits of either their constitutional or statutory claims8 , a 
necessary prerequisite for injunctive relief. The Court of 
1. Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 235 Cal. App. 3d 654, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (1991). 
2. Id. at 658, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79. 
3. Id. at 668, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 86. 
4.Id. 
5. Id. at 670-71, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 88. 
6. Id. at 660, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79. 
7. See Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d 654, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77. The trial court found the 
questions were not unjustifiably intrusive because it erroneously applied a reason· 
ableness! legitimate interest test to overcome an applicant's constitutional right to pri. 
vacy when it should have applied a compelling interest standard. 
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Appeal found that the trial court had abused its discretion by 
committing an error oflaw9 , It found that the appellants had 
established a prima facie case for injunction reliepo, 
Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the trial court's 
denial of the preliminary injunction 11, 
II, FACTS 
Sibi Soroka, Sue Urry and William d'Arcangelo (here-
inafter, "Appellants") were all applicants for security officer 
positions at a Target Store (hereinafter, "Respondent"), owned 
and operated by Dayton Hudson Corporation (hereinafter, 
"Respondent")12, As a condition of employment, Respondent 
required all applicants for security officer positions to take a 
psychological screening test (hereinafter, "Psychscreen")13, 
This test was composed of 704 true-false questions and the 
applicants were instructed to answer every question14, The 
completed test would be scored and interpreted by a psycho-
logical consulting firm16, The applicants would be rated on five 
traits: emotional stability, interpersonal style, addiction poten-
tial, dependability and reliability, and socialization16, Based 
upon the rating, the firm would recommend whether the appli-
8. Having determined that plaintiffs were not likely to prevail on the merits of 
their claims, the trial court did not consider the second requirement for issuing a pre-
liminary injunction, i.e. whether the plaintiffs would suffer greater harm if the 
injunction did not issue than the defendant would if it did issue. 
9. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 668, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86. The appellate court deter-
mined that the trial court committed several errors oflaw. The reversal of the trial 
court was based on its erroneous application ofa reasonableness/legitimate interest 
test instead of the compelling interest test. 
10. rd. at 672, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89. The appellate court found the questions on 
the psychological screening test were unjustifiably intrusive, and thus, the appellants 
would likely prevail at trial on the merits of both their constitutional and statutory claims. 
In addition, the appellate court found that the appellants would suffer a greater harm 
if the injunction did not issue, than would the respondent if the injunction did issue. 
11. rd. 
12. rd. at 658, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79. 
13. rd. Respondent contends that the test is intended to screen out those appli-
cants who are emotionally unstable, who would not take directions and who would jeop-
ardize customers or other employees. Though security officers do not carry guns, they 
do have handcuffs and are authorized to use force in self- defense. Respondent 
defends the test as being necessary for safety reasons and to insure fitness for the posi-
tion. The test is a combination of two psychological tests that have been used to screen 
out emotionally unfit applicants for public safety positions such as police officers, pilots, 
air traffic controllers and nuclear power plant operators. 
14. rd. at 659, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79. 
15. rd. at 659, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 80. 
16. rd. 
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cants should be hiredl7, This recommendation would carry 
great weight in the final hiring decisionsl8, 
Appellants did not challenge the practice of administering 
psychological evaluations per se; they challenged certain ques-
tions on the "Psychscreen" as being invasive and not job- relat-
edl9 , Specifically, Appellants claimed that the questions 
regarding religious attitudes20 and the questions regarding 
sexual orientation21 violated their constitutional right to pri-
vacy22, the Fair Employment and Housing Act2S , and the 
California Labor Code24 , 
The trial court held that a job applicant's constitutional 
right to privacy may be violated by an employer who could show 
a legitimate interest for the violation26, The trial court believed 
that the use of the "Psych screen" was reasonable because the 
employer had showed a legitimate interest for using it28 , In 
addition, the trial court found that the questions regarding reli-
gious attitudes were not intended to reveal an applicant's reli-
gious beliefs, and thus, were not violative of the Fair Housing 
and Employment Act27 , Finally, the trial court held that the 
questions regarding sexual orientation were not intended to 
17. [d. 
IS. [d. 
19. [d. at 660, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at SO. 
20. [d. at 659, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79-S0. The questions regarding religious atti-
tudes included: "I feel sure that there is only one true religion .. .! have no patience with 
people who believe there is only one true religion ... My soul sometimes leaves my 
body ... A minister can cure disease by praying and putting his hand on your 
head ... Everything is turning out just like the prophets of the Bible said it would .. .! go 
to church almost every week ... 1 believe in the second coming ofChrist ... I believe in a 
life hereaf.\er .. .! am very religious (more than most people) .. .! believe my sins are unpar-
donable .. .! believe there is a God ... I believe there is a Devil and a Hell in afterlife: 
21. [d. at 659, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at SO. The questions regarding sexual orientation 
included: "I wish I were not bothered by thoughts about sex .... 1 have never been in 
trouble because of my sex behavior .... 1 have been in trouble one or more times because 
of my sex behavior .... My sex life is satisfactory .... 1 am very strongly attracted by mem-
bers of my own sex .... I have often wished I were a girl.. .. (Or if your are a girl) I have 
never been sorry that I am a girL .. .! have never indulged in any unusual sex prac-
tices .... I am worried about sex matters .... 1 like to talk about sex .... Many of my dreams 
are about sex matters." 
22. Cal. Const. art. I, § 1 (1S79, amended 1972). 
23. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12920, 12940 (West 19S0). 
24. Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1101, 1102 (West 19S9). 
25. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 661, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at S1. 
26. [d. The trial court found that Target had demonstrated a legitimate inter-
est in psychologically screening applicants for security positions to minimize the 
potential danger to its customers and others. Presumably, a "legitimate interest" is 
sufficient to pass the deferential reasonableness test, whereas it would be insufficient 
to pass the more exacting standard of "compelling interest". 
27. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 669,1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at S7. 
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force applicants to reveal their sexual orientation, and thus, 
were not violative of the Labor Code28. 
III. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
1. standard for permissible violation of privacy right 
The appellate court held that the trial court abused its 
discretion by committing an error of law when it applied the 
wrong standard in assessing a potential violation of the state 
constitutional right to privacy39. 
The California Constitution provides: 
"All people are by nature free and indepen-
dent and have inalienable rights. Among 
these are enjoying and defending life and lib-
erty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting 
property, and pursuing and obtaining safe-
ty, happiness, and privacy"3o. 
California courts have held that public and private employers 
must justify any intrusion into an employee's privacy by 
demonstrating a compelling interest3!. If the employer is able 
to show a compelling interest, the employer must still show that 
the inquiries were job related33. 
The question presented here was whether there was a dis-
tinction between an employee's privacy rights and an appli-
cant's, i.e., whether the compelling interest standard should 
also be applied when questioning job applicants. Appellants 
28. [d. at 670, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87. 
29. rd. at 668, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86. 
30. Cal. Const. Art. I, § 1 (1879, amended 1972). 
31. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 774-75, 533 P.2d 222,234, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 
106 (1975) [any intervention into right to privacy must be justified by compelling inter· 
est]; Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d I, 17-20, 267 Cal. 
Rptr. 618, 626-629 (1990) [public and private employers must demonstrate a compelling 
interest] cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 111 S.Ct. 344 (1990); Wilkinson v. Times Mirror 
Corporation, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 1040-43,264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 202, (1989) [the right 
to privacy is protected from private as well as public employers, but also held that if 
the right is not substantially burdened compelling interest may not be required]. 
32. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 666,.1 Cal. App. 2d at 85. 
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argued that Respondent was required to demonstrate a com-
pelling interest before intruding on their right to privacy, just 
as would be required if they were employees33• 
The trial court, relying on Wilkinson v. Times Mirror 
Corporations., which recognized a distinction between employ-
ees and applicantsS6, applied a reasonableness testS8 and held 
that the state constitution only required Respondent to show 
a legitimate interest in order to overcome a job applicant's right 
to privacy". Respondent argued that the "Psychscreen" was 
used for screening out emotionally unstable security officer 
applicants in order to protect its customersss, which the trial 
court found to be a legitimate interest. Using the Wilkinson 
reasonableness standard, the court found that Respondent's 
legitimate interest was sufficient to overcome Appellants' 
right to privacys9. 
The appellate court disagreed with Wilkinson's distinction 
between employees and job applicants and held that the trial 
court's reliance on it amounted to a reversible error oflaw'°. It 
held that a compelling interest is uniformly required because 
there was no legitimate distinction between the privacy rights 
of employees and job applicants". In declining to follow 
Wilkinson42, the appellate court relied on several sources: 1) an 
33. Id. at 663, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 82. 
34. Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corporation, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 264 Cal. 
Rptr. 194 (1989) [pre-employment drug testing did not violate job applicants' state 
constitutional right to privacy because employer had a legitimate interest and it was 
reasonable]. By requiring a mere showing of a legitimate interest to overcome a 
job applicant's constitutional right to privacy, this case, by distinguishing between 
employees and applicants departed significantly from prior California case law 
which had always required a demonstration of a compelling interest to overcome this 
right. 
35. Id. at 1049, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 204: ·Simply put, applicants for jobs ... have a 
choice; they may consent to the limited invasion of their privacy resulting from the 
[drug] testing, or may decline both the test and the conditional offer of employment." 
36. Id. at 1048, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 203. 
37. The two standards differ significantly. A compelling interest is a strict 
level of judicial scrutiny which is more difficult to prove in order to pass constitutional 
muster than the less exacting, deferential reasonableness standard, which requires 
only a showing of a legitimate interest. 
38. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 658, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 79. 
39. Id. at 663, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 82. 
40. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 668, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86. 
41. Id. at 664, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83. 
42. As a matter of stare decisis, an intermediate appellate court's holding is 
only binding on inferior courts. Intermediate appellate courts are "not compelled 
to apply the law as interpreted by a court of equivalent jurisdiction if [it] find[s] that 
court's reasoning unpersuasive". Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 668,1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
at 86, n.8. 
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examination ofthe legislative history of the state constitutional 
amendment which elevated privacy to an enumerated and 
inalienable right; 2) pre-Wilkinson case law; and 3) a critical 
analysis of the Wilkinson rationale. 
a) legislative history 
Before 1972, privacy was not an enumerated right in the 
state constitution. In 1972, California voters amended the state 
constitution; "California [has] accord[ed] privacy the consti-
tutional status of an inalienable right", on a par with defend-
ing life and possessing property"". In its decision, the court 
relied heavily on the arguments the state set forth in the bal-
lot pamphlet for the proposed amendment to the constitu-
tion46• This "ballot argument" encompasses the only legislative 
history behind the state constitutional right to privac~. First, 
the court noted that the ballot argument provided that the con-
stitutional right to privacy could only be overcome by a com-
pelling interest4? Next, the court found that the voters 
affirmatively intended for there to be no distinction between 
the privacy rights of employees and job applicants48• In sum, 
the court found that a requirement of a compelling interest to 
overcome a job applicant's privacy right was in accord with the 
intent of the voters and thus was constitutionally mandated. 
43. An inalienable right is one "which may not be violated by anyone". Wilkinson 
v. Times Mirror Corporation, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 1042, 264 Cal. Rptr. 194. 199 
(1989). 
44. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 662, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 82; see also Luck v. 
Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1, 18,267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 627 
(1990) [Appellate courts have repeatedly held that the right to privacy is an inalien-
able right] cert. denied, _ U.S. _, III S.Ct. 344 (1990); Wilkinson v. Times Mirror 
Corporation, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 1037, 264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 199 (1989) ["Privacy is ... 
considered an inalienable right, which may not be violated by anyone".]; Porten v. 
University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 829,134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (1976). 
45. Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to the vot-
ers, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1972) pp. 27-28. 
46. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 666-67,1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85. 
47. 1d. at 665, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84; see Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. 
Const. with arguments to voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1972) pp. 27-28; see also White 
v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d at 775, 533 P.2d at 234,120 Cal. Rptr. at 106; Luck v. Southern 
Pacific Transportation Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d at 20,267 Cal. Rptr. at 629. 
48. The appellate court found that when voters amended the constitution, it was 
their intent to give inalienable privacy rights to job applicants as well as employees. 
"The ballot argument specifically refers tojob applicants when it states, '[e]ach time 
we ... interview for a job, ... a dossier is opened and an informational profile is sketched.'" 
Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 664, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83; see also, Central Valley Ch. 7th 
Step Foundation. Inc. v. Younger, 214 Cal. App. 3d 145, 151, 162- 65, 262 Cal. Rptr. 
496,499,506-07 (1989) [applied compelling interest in case involving job applicant]. 
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b) pre-Wilkinson case law 
The court examined pre-Wilkinson case law and discovered 
that no distinction had previously been made between employ-
ees and applicants in regard to their privacy rights. For 
instance, in Central Valley Chap. 7th Step Foundation, Inc. v. 
Younger49, a public employer was required to demonstrate a 
compelling interest in order to obtain an applicant's arrest 
records. The fact that this case involved a public employer was 
irrelevant because private and public employers are equally 
bound by the terms of the privacy provision60• 
The appellate court was satisfied that the Wilkinson dis-
tinction between applicants and employees was not in harmony 
with either the legislative history or prior case law. 
c) critical analysis of the Wilkinson rationale 
Finally, the appellate court found that Wilkinson's aberrant 
rule was derived in part from improper inferences drawn from 
Schmidt v. Superior Court61 • In Schmidt, the petitioners 
argued that their constitutional right to familial privacy was 
violated by an age-based restriction at a private mobilehome 
park62. The California Supreme Court rejected those claims 
because it found that the regulation was "neither irrational or 
arbitrary ... "63. The Wilkinson court interpreted this holding to 
mean that "as long as [the right to privacy] is not substantially 
burdened or affected, justification by a compelling interest is 
not required. Instead, the operative question is whether the 
challenged conduct is reasonable"64. 
The appellate court found Wilkinson's interpretation unten-
able for several reasons. First, it found that the property 
interests in Schmidt were distinguishable as being of a less per-
sonal nature than the privacy interests contemplated by the 
49. Central Valley Chap. 7th Step Foundation, Inc. v. Younger, 214 Cal. App. 3d 
145, 262 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1989). 
50. Luck, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 19,267 Cal. Rptr. at 627 (1990); Wilkinson v. Times 
Mirror Corp., 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 1040-44,264 Cal. Rptr. 194, 198-200 (1989) [arti-
cle 1, section 1 limits private entities]. 
51. Schmidt v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 3d 370, 769 P.2d 932,256 Cal. Rptr. 750 
(1989) [upholding a rule limiting residence in a private mobilehome park to persons 
25 years of age or older]. 
52. [d. 
53. [d. at 383, 769 P.2d at 945, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 763. 
54. Wilkinson, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1047, 264 Cal. Rptr at 203. 
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constitutional amendment&&. Secondly, a reasonableness stan-
dard is at odds with the ballot argument which provides sole-
ly for a compelling interest standard when privacy interests are 
at stake". Finally, the court asserts that if the California 
Supreme Court in Schmidt were going to make such a sub-
stantial deviation from the previous rule, it would have indi-
cated this unambiguously&7. 
After justifying its unwillingness to follow Wilkinson, the 
appellate court found that the trial court had abused its dis-
cretion by applying the reasonableness test, rather than the 
compelling interest test". Furthermore, the appellate court 
held that under the proper, compelling interest test, Appellants 
were likely to prevail on the merits of their constitutional 
claims611• 
2. nexus requirement 
In addition to demonstrating a compelling interest, 
Respondent also needed to show a nexus between the 
"Psychscreen" questions asked and the security officer positions 
being applied forso• Respondent asserted that the questions 
were job-related because they were used to determine the 
emotional stability of its applicants81• Respondent made gen-
eral claims that since it implemented the "Psychscreen" it 
had seen an overall improvement in the quality and perfor-
mance of its security officers82 • The trial court, relying on 
Wilkinson 83 , held that these generalized claims were suffi-
cient to satisfy the nexus requirement.84 
55. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 665, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84. 
56. See Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to vot-
ers, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1972) pp.27-28; White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775, 533 P.2d 
222,234,120 Cal. Rptr. 106, (1975); Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 218 
Cal. App. 3d 1,20,267 Cal. Rptr. 618,628-29 (1990), cert. denied _ U.S. _, 111 S.Ct. 
344. 
57. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 665,1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84. 
58. 1d. at 668, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86. 
59.1d. 
60. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 667,1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85. 
61. 1d. at 668, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 86. 
62.1d. 
63. Wilkinson, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1053,264 Cal. Rptr. at 206. [Court held that 
an employer has a legitimate interest in not hiring individuals whose drug abuse may 
render them unable to perform their job responsibilities in a satisfactory manner. The 
court further held a general claim that pre-employment drug testing was related to 
this legitimate interest satisfied nexus requirement.] 
64. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 667,1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85. 
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The appellate court again declined to follow Wilkinson. It 
found that the trial court had committed an error of law 
because a generalized justification was insufficient to intrude 
on an individual's privacy rights66. To support its conclusions 
the court relied on: 1) federal precedent; 2) legislative histo-
ry; and 3) California Supreme Court decisions66. 
a) federal precedent 
When interpreting the state right to privacy, California 
courts have looked to federal precedents for guidance 67. 
Accordingly, the appellate court considered the federal nexus 
requirement. It found that federal courts require "a clear, 
direct nexus between the nature of the employee's duty and the 
nature of the [privacy] violation"66. Because the California 
Constitution enumerates the right to privacy while the Federal 
Constitution does not, the state right to privacy is necessari-
ly broader than the federal right69. Thus, the federal require-
ment of a "clear, direct nexus" establishes the bare minimum 
that is required in California courts70. The appellate court held 
that since the state constitution required at least a "clear, 
direct nexus", Target's generalized nexus was insufficient to 
overcome Appellants' privacy rights.71 
b) legislative history 
Next, the appellate court turned to the only legislative 
history for the privacy amendment, the ballot argument. The 
ballot argument asserted that the right to privacy would "pre-
clude the collection of extraneous or frivolous information"72. 
The appellate court found that this language supported a neg-
ative inference that employers could only compel employees to 
65. [d. 
66. Long Beach City Employees Assn. v. City of Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d 937,719 
P.2d 660, 227 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1986); White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757,533 P.2d 222,120 
Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975). 
67. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 666,1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85. 
68. Luck, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1, 24, 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 632 (1990). 
69. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 666, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85. 
70. [d. 
71. [d. at 668, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86. "In its opposition to Soroka's motion for pre-
liminary injunction, Target made no showing that a person's religious beliefs or sex-
ual orientation have any bearing on the emotional stability to perform a [store 
security officer's1 job responsibilities. It did no more than to make generalized claims 
about the Psychscreen's relationship to emotional fitness and to assert that it has seen 
an overall improvement in [store security officer1 quality and performance since it 
implemented the Psychscreen." 
72. Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Gen. 
Elec. (Nov. 7, 1972) p. 28. 
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answer questions that were "necessary to achieve the pur-
pose for which the information.has been gathered"73. 
c) California Supreme Court decisions 
In addition to the legislative history, the appellate court 
found that the California Supreme Court had recognized the 
nexus requirement. In Long Beach City Employees Assn. v. City 
of Long Beach74 , the California Supreme Court held that a 
public employer may only require workers to answer ques-
tions that are "specifically, directly and narrowly related[d] to 
the performance of the employee's official duties"76. In White 
v. Davis76 the Supreme Court held that the privacy amendment 
was intended '(to avoid "the overbroad collection ... of unneces-
sary personal information"77. 
In light of these cases, the appellate court found that 
Respondent failed to show the requisite clear, direct nexus 
between the Psychscreen's questions and its stated purpose of 
determining an applicant's emotional stability78. Since the 
information sought was not job-related, the court held the 
"collection [was] overbroa'd, and the information unneces-
sary"79, and thus was unconstitutional. 
Therefore, Respondent had failed to show both the com-
pelling interest and the requisite nexus. The appellate court 
concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion when 
it found that Appellants would not prevail on the merits of their 
constitutional claim80. 
B. STATUTORY CLAIMS 
Since the appellate court had already determined that the 
injunction should have issued based on Appellants' constitu-
tional claim, determining whether Appellants would have 
73. Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Gen. 
Elec.(Nov. 7,1972) p. 28. 
74. Long Beach City Employees Assn. v. City of Long Beach, 41 Cal. 3d 937,719 
P.2d 660, 227 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1986). 
75. Id. at 947,719 P.2d at 670,227 Cal. Rptr. at 95-96. 
76. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222,120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975). 
77. Id. at 775, 533 P.2d at 240,120 Cal. Rptr. at 106. 
78. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 668, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86. 
79. Id. at 667,1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85. 
80. Id. at 668, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86. 
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prevailed on their statutory claims was unnecessarylll. Despite 
this lack of necessity, the appellate court chose to address the 
claims for the purpose of guiding the lower court82• Appellants 
contended that they would have prevailed at trial on their 
claims that Respondent violated the Fair Housing and 
Employment Act83 and the California Labor Code8'. 
1. Fair Housing and Employment Act 
The Fair Housing and Employment Act prohibits employ-
ers from refusing to hire a person on the basis of their religious 
beliefs86. Employers are also prohibited from making any non-
job-related inquiry that expresses "any specification ... as 
to ... religious creed .... "86. The trial court held that the questions 
regarding religious attitudes were not intended to reveal the 
applicant's religious beliefs87• 
The appellate court disagreed and held that the trial court 
had committed an error oflaw68 • The appellate court found that 
Appellants had made a prima facie showing of an impermissible 
inquiry89. The burden then shifted to Respondent to prove 
that the inquiry was justified as being job-related90• The court 
had already determined in its nexus discussion that the ques-
tions regarding religious beliefs were not job-related91 • Thus, 
the Psychscreen's questions relating to religious attitudes did 
constitute the type of inquiry that the Act expressly prohibits. 
Accordingly, the, court determined that Appellants would like-
ly prevail at trial on the merits of this claim92 • 
81. [d. at 669, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86. 
82. [d. Because the appellate court was not required to address the statutory 
issues, it is unclear whether the remaining discussion is case law or whether it is dicta. 
83. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12920, 12940 (West 1980). 
84. Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1101, 1102 (West 1989). 
85. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12920, 12940 (West 1980). 
86. Cal. Gov't Code § 12940 (d) (West 1980). 
87. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 669,1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87. 
88. [d. 
89. To make a prima facie showing of impermissible inquiry, the complainant 
must show that the questions asked were intended to reveal their religious beliefs. 
Upon a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the respondent to show that their 
questions fall into the "job-related" exception provided for in the Act. 
90. [d. at 670, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87. 
91. [d. In the nexus discussion, the court held that in order for a question to be 
considered job-related, there must at least be a clear, direct nexus between the 
inquiry and the purpose sought to be achieved and that the inquiry must be necessary . 
to achieve that purpose. 
92. [d. 
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2. Labor Code 
Sections 1101 and 1102 of the California Labor Code93 pro-
tect an employee's fundamental right to engage in political 
activity without employer interference94• This right was held 
to protect applicants as well as employees96 • In Gay Law 
Students u. Pacific Tel. & Tel. CO.96 the California Supreme 
Court, per Justice Tobriner, held that being homosexual falls 
within the purview of political activity, and thus is protected 
by sections 1101 and 1102 of the California Labor Code97 • Gay 
Law Students seemed only to prohibit public employers from 
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation. Then in 
1986, the California Attorney General published his opinion 
that Labor Code sections 1101 and 1102 also prohibited private 
employers from discriminating on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion98 • 
Appellants argued that Respondent was in violation of the 
Labor Code because certain questions on the Psychscreen 
were intended to reveal the applicant's sexual orientation99• 
The trial court disagreed1oo• However, the appellate court held 
93. Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1101, 1102 (West 1989). 
Section 1101 provides: "No employer shall make, adopt, or 
enforce any rule, regulation, or policy: a) forbidding or pre-
venting employees from engaging or participating in politics 
or from becoming candidates for public office. b) controlling 
or directing, or tending to control or direct the political 
activities or affiliations of employees." 
Section 1102 provides: "No employer shall coerce or influence 
or attempt to coerce or influence his employees through or by 
means of threat of discharge or loss of employment to adopt 
or follow or refrain from adopting or following any particu-
lar course or line of political action or political activity." 
94. Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 487, 595 
P.2d 592, 610, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14,32 (1979). 
95. ld. at 487 n.16, 595 P.2d at 610, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 32. 
96. Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co, 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 
592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979). 
97. ld. at 487,595 P.2d at 610, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 32: Justice Tobriner speaking 
for the court: "The struggle of the homosexual community for equal rights, particu-
larly in the field of employment, must be recognized as a political activity." 
98. 69 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 80, 82 (1986). In 1986, then Assemblyperson Art Agnos, 
requested Attorney General John Van De Kamp's opinion as to whether Labor Code sec-
tions 1101 and 1102 prohibited private employers from discriminating on the basis of 
sexual orientation. He was of the opinion that they did. The fact that the appellate 
court cites this opinion is significant because the record does not evidence any asser-
tion by the trial court that the Labor Code would not apply to a private employer. 
99. Soroka, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 670,1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87. 
100. ld. 
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that the trial court committed an error of law when it deter-
mined that questions such as "I am very strongly attracted by 
members of my own sex"IOI were not intended to reveal the 
applicant's sexual orientation. The appellate court reasoned 
that a person who would identify themselves as homosexual, 
might be "stigmatized as ,willing to defy or violate traditional 
values and mores"102 and thus would receive low marks for 
"socialization"I03. The appellate court held that these questions 
were discriminatory as a matter oflawlO4. It further held that 
Target's practice was an attempt to coerce the applicant to 
refrain from expressing a homosexual orientation by the threat 
ofloss of employment. Such a practice is an express violation 
of the Labor Codel05. The court then concluded that Appellants 
would likely have prevailed on the merits of this claim as 
well. 106 
C. INTERIM HARM 
In order for a preliminary injunction to issue, there must 
be proof that the movant will likely prevail on the merits at trial 
and that the movant would suffer greater harm if the injunc-
tion did not issue than non-movant would if it did issuel07. 
Having determined that Appellants would likely prevail at trial 
on the merits of their claims, the appellate court only had to 
determine whether Appellants would suffer greater harm if the 
injunction did not issue, than Respondent would if it did. 
The court found that Appellants would suffer the greater 
harm if the injunction were not grantedl08. The appellate 
court concluded that both prongs of the preliminary injunction 
test had been met and reversed the trial court's denial of the 
motion. 
101. [d. at 671, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 88. 
102. [d. 
103. [d. "Socialization" is one of the five traits that the Psychscreen is used to 
evaluate. It defines socialization as "the extent to which an individual subscribes to 




107. Wilkinson, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1039,264 Cal. Rptr. at 197. 
108. The harm to Appellants would be significant because they had already 
demonstrated a strong probability that the test violated their rights. If no injunction 
were issued, Respondent would be allowed to continue to administer the test, putting 
Appellants in the precarious position of either surrendering their constitutional 
rights or surrendering their option to apply for security officer positions at Target 
stores. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This note is included in the Women's Law Forum primar-
ily because this case stands as the only case law in California 
that expressly recognizes that it is illegal in California for 
employers, public and private, to discriminate against people 
on the basis of sexual orientation. Sexual orientation is not an 
enumerated protected class. In 1991, the California state leg-
islature passed Assembly Bill 101 that would have added sex-
ual orientation to the Fair Housing and Employment Act's 
list of enumerated protected classes. Similar statewide pro-
tective legislation for lesbians and gay men has been enacted 
in Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and most 
recently, in New Jersey. In September 1991, Governor Wilson 
disgraced the state of California when he vetoed the bill. 
Defending his action, Wilson claimed that there were already 
sufficient protections for homosexuals against employment 
discrimination. To support his claim, he pointed to the 
California Supreme Court's holding in Gay Law Students 
Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. 109 
Gay Law Students was a 4-3 decision, and was decided by 
a very liberal Supreme Courtl1O • If the present conservative 
Supreme Court were to have the occasion to reconsider the 
rationale supporting Gay Law Students, it might well be over-
turned. By embracing Gay Law Students and its rationale, the 
Court of Appeal is strengthening the shaky ground upon which 
our protections rest. 
Governor Wilson also cited Attorney General John Van De 
Kamp's 1986 opinion111 to support his claims. This opinion 
has gone largely ignored. More importantly, by itself, the 
opinion has no force of law. By citing it, the court in Soroka 
gave the opinion the force of law. 
109. Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 595 P.2d 
592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979). (interpreting homosexuality as political activity, bring-
ing homosexuals within the employment discrimination protection of the Labor 
Code). 
110. In 1979 the California Supreme Court Justices were: Chief Justice Bird, and 
Justices Tobriner, Mosk, Newman, Richardson, Clark, and Manuel. The majority opin-
ion in Gay Law Students was written by Tobriner, with whom Bird, Mosk, and 
Newman concurred. Today the California Supreme Court Justices are: Chief Justice 
Lucas, and Justices Arabian, Baxter, Broussard, George, Kennard, Panelli, and 
Mosk. 
111. 69 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 80, 82 (1986). (concluding that the Labor Code 
prohibits private employers from discriminating against individuals on the basis of 
their sexual orientation, private or manifest). 
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What is interesting to note, is that there seemed to be no 
argument from the trial court about how to interpret the 
Labor Code. The courts only disagreed on the interpretation 
of the "Psychs ere en" questions. The appellate court referred 
to both Gay Law Students and to the Attorney General's opin-
ion without provocation or necessity. It seems that the appel-
late court wanted to provide very clear guidance for the trial 
court. Perhaps it is in the wake of the AB 101 veto that the 
court felt compelled to clarify and validate the protections 
that Governor Wilson boasted. Although this case is only 
binding on lower courts, it represents some hope that other 
courts will adhere to and expand upon the present, albeit 
sketchy, protections that Governor Wilson felt were adequate 
to protect the homosexual population fr.om employment dis-
crimination. 
V. ADDENDUM 
At the time of this note's publication, the California 
Supreme Court has granted review of this case. As of yet, no 
briefing schedule has been set. 
The California Supreme Court is currently reviewing anoth-
er state constitutional right to privacy case, Hill v. NCAA112, 
where Stanford University athletes alleged that the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association's drug testing policy violated 
their state constitutional right to privacy. After that case is 
decided, it is likely that the Supreme Court will not review 
Soroka, but instead will remand to the appellate court for 
reconsideration according to Hill. If Soroka is remanded for 
reconsideration on the constitutional claim only, the sexual ori-
entation issue may not be implicated. 
However, even if the appellate court is forced to reverse its 
position on the constitutional right to privacy issue, the pre-
liminary injunction should still issue because the appellate 
112. Hill v. N.C.A.A, 230 Cal. App. 3d 1714, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1990); review 
granted December 20,1990. In this case, student athletes sued the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association seeking to have the NCAA enjoined from enforcing its drug test-
ing program. The Superior Court, Santa Clara County found that the program vio-
lated student athletes' state constitutional right to privacy. The Court of Appeal, Sixth 
District affirmed. That court held 1) the state constitutional right to privacy extends 
to voluntary, private association's actions; and 2).drug testing program violated 
state constitutional right to privacy because association did not show compelling 
need for program. 
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court found that Appellants would likely prevail on their 
statutory claims. But a decision based solely on the statuto-
ry claims promotes the real possibility that the sexual 
orientation issue will resurface as the target of dispute. This 
is disconcerting because of the fear that the current conser-
vative Court may overturn Gay Law Students, one of the only 
existing protections for the gay community. 
Solace exists however. Without Gay Law Students, the 
lack of protection for lesbians and gay men in employment will 
be so conspicuous that Governor Wilson will be unable to 
assert otherwise when the new AB 101-type bill, just introduced 
in the California Legislature, (hopefully) arrives on his desk. 
Albeit oddly paradoxical, if Gay Law Students were over-
turned, Governor Wilson might be forced to sign the new gay 
rights bill into law because he would be unable to defend a veto 
of the new bill on the grounds that there were adequate pro-
tections already in place. 
Michael Weiss* 
-Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993. 
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IV. FAMILY LAW 
A. LESBIAN PARENTING 
1. Refusal to grant custody or visitation rights to lesbian 
partner who shared equally in parenting of children 
with partner, the natural mother. 
Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831, 279 Cal. 
Rptr. 212 (1991). In Nancy S. v. Michele G.,t the California 
Court of Appeal, First District, unanimously affirmed the trial 
court's ruling that a lesbian, who had shared equally in the par-
enting of two children with her partner, the children's natural 
mother, was unable to establish the existence of a parent-
child relationship under the Uniform Parentage Act2 • Without 
establishing such status, the lesbian partner had no legal 
rights to visit with or have custody of the childrens• The appel-
late court further affirmed that the natural mother was the only 
legal parent of the two minor children, entitling her to sole legal 
and physical custody'. Therefore, any further contact between 
the lesbian partner and the children would require the natu-
ral mother's consent6• 
I. FACTS 
Nancy (hereinafter, "Respondent") and Michele (hereinafter, 
"Appellant") began living together in August 1969. In 
November of that year they had a private "marriage ceremo-
ny"6. Eventually, they decided to have children together by 
inseminating Respondent7• Respondent gave birth to two chil-
dren: K. in June 1980, and S. in June 19848 • In both instances, 
Appellant was listed on the birth certificate as the father and 
both children were given Appellant's family name9• Both chil-
dren referred to Appellant as "Mom"lo. Appellant and 
1. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831,279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1991). 
2. Uniform Parentage Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 7000 et seq. (West 1983). 
3. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 831,279 Cal. Rptr. at 214. 
4. Id. at 835, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215. 
5. 1d. at 834, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 214. 
6. 1d. The court did not decide whether the marriage was entitled to any legal 
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Respondent had considered arranging for Appellant to adopt 
the children, but they never initiated the formal adoption pro-
ceedings 11. 
In January 1985, Appellant and Respondent separatedl2 • 
For the next three years the parties abided by an agreement that 
K would live with Appellant and S. would live with Respondentl3• 
Respondent wanted to change the arrangement so that both chil-
dren would be with each adult fifty percent of the time l4 • 
Appellant opposed any change and attempts to mediate the 
dispute failed 16• Respondent commenced this action under the 
Uniform Parentage Act (hereinafter "UPA") seeking three dec-
larations: 1) that Appellant was not a parent of either child; 2) 
that Respondent, as the biological mother, was entitled to sole 
legal and physical custody; and 3) that Appellant was entitled 
to visitation only with Respondent's consentl6• Appellant sought 
to qualify as a parent in order to attain rights of custody and vis-
itation under the UPAt7· Appellant admitted that she was not the 
biological mother and had not adopted the children, but argued 
that notwithstanding the UPA, she had either attained the sta-
tus of a de facto parentiS, or alternatively that Respondent 
should be estopped to deny Appellant's status as a parent19• 
The trial court found that Appellant was not a parent 
under the UPA. Thus, even if Appellant could prove that she 
had attained the status of de facto parent, the court was 
without jurisdiction to grant the visitation and custody rights, 
over the objections of Respondent, who did qualify as a par-
ent under the act20 • Further, by denying Appellant all relief, 
the court also impliedly found as a matter of law that 








17. [d. at 835,279 Cal. Rptr. at 214. 
18. A "de facto" parent is defined in In re B.G., 11 Cal.3d 679, 692, 523 P.2d 244, 
253, 114 Cal.Rptr. 444, 453 (1974) at n.18 as "that person who, on a day-to-day basis, 
assumes the role of parent, seeking to fulfill both the child's physical needs and his 
psychological need for affection and care". Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 
at 836, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216. 
19. [d. 
20. [d. at 835 n.2., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215. 
21. [d. at 835 n.l., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215. 
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II. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. JURISDICTION. 
The Court of Appeal first decided whether the trial court 
had jurisdiction· to award custody and/or visitation rights to 
Appellant. The court held that the trial court did have juris-
diction. "A court .. Jacks 'jurisdiction' only ifit has no power to 
render a decision over the subject in dispute"22. It cited Curiale 
v. Reagan2S, a case strikingly similar to the case at bar, but 
where the court lacked jurisdiction24 • There, the lesbian part-
ner was asserting that she was a de facto parent, as opposed 
to a parent. The case was dismissed because the court lacked 
the power to decide whether she was a de facto parent. The case 
here is distinguishable in that Appellant had always main-
tained that she was a parent, as opposed to a de facto parent. 
In addition, Appellant did not institute the proceedings here, 
as the lesbian partner in Curiale did. Thus, the appellate 
court, here, found that the trial court did have jurisdiction 
under the UPA to make the parental determination26 • Upon 
22. [d. at 835 n.2., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215. 
23. Curiale v. Reagan, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1597, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1990). 
24. Curiale v. Reagan, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1597,272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1990), involved 
two lesbians disputing the custody of their child, conceived during their relationship by 
artificial insemination. The Curiale court held that 1) plaintiff, non- biological mother 
lacked standing to bring an action for custody and/or visitation; and 2) that the court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to award custody and/or visitation rights over the 
objections of the "natural" mother. Plaintiff had asserted that Civil Code section 7015 
(UPA) conferred standing upon any interested person to bring an action to determine 
the existence of a parent-child relationship. Cal. Civ. Code § 7015 (West 1983). On 
appeal, the court held that Civil Code section 7015 (UPA) had no application where 
the defendant was the undisputed natural mother of the child. Curiale v. Reagan, 222 
Cal. App. 3d at 1600,272 Cal. Rptr. at 522. Plaintiff asserted that Civil Code section 
4600 (Family Law Act) conferred subject matter jurisdiction. Cal. Civ. Code § 4600 
(West 1983). It provides in relevant part: "In any proceeding where there is at issue 
the custody ofa minor child, the court may, during the pendency of the proceeding or 
at any time thereafter, make such orderfor the custody of the child during minority 
as may seem necessary or proper." [d. at 1600 n.2., 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522. On appeal, 
the court held that Civil Code section 4600 did not create subject matter jurisdiction; 
there had to be an independent basis. [d. at 1600, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522. It held that 
jurisdiction to adjudicate custody depended on some proceeding properly before the 
court such as dissolution, dependency, or guardianship. [d. The court concluded that 
it had no jurisdiction to award custody or visitation rights to plaintiff because plain-
tiff had no colorable claim of right to custody and there was no statutory basis for plain-
tiffs claim of parental status. [d. at 1598, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 522. On appeal, the court 
affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs claim. 
25. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831, 835, 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 215 
(1991). The distinction the court makes between the cases is unclear. In Curiale, the 
lesbian partner sought standing through the UPA and subject matter jurisdiction 
through the Family Law Act. The court denied both claims, arguably because without 
standing, the proceeding involving custody was not properly before the court. Curiale 
v. Reagan, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1600, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 521. In Nancy S., the 
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finding that Appellant was not a parent under the UPA, the 
trial court had jurisdiction to deny Appellant custody and/or 
visitation rights28 • 
B. PARENTAL STATUS DETERMINATION UNDER THE UPA. 
The appellate court next decided whether the trial court cor-
rectly found that Appellant was not a parent under the UPA 
definition. The UPA defines a parent as one who is the natu-
ral or adoptive parent of a child27 • The appellate court reviewed 
the undisputed facts and held that the trial court correctly 
determined that Appellant could not establish parental status 
under the UPA because: 1) Appellant was not the natural 
mother; 2) she had not adopted either of the children; and 3) 
she did not contend that she and Respondent had a legally rec-
ognized marriage when the children were born28 • 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF UPA PARENTAL STATUS. 
Whether a party has the status of a parent or a non-parent 
is of critical importance because that status dictates the prop-
er test to be applied in a custody/visitation dispute under 
Civil Code section 460029• Ifboth parties have parental status, 
the award of custody or visitation will be decided on the basis 
lesbian partner did not need to establish standing because the natural mother brought 
the action. It appears that subject matter jurisdiction was held to exist because the 
action (determining parentage under UPA) was a proceeding properly before the 
court where custody was at issue. However, a determination of parentage under the 
UPA is not an enumerated proceeding upon which jurisdiction depends, i.e. dissolu-
tion, guardianship, or dependency. Curiale v. Reagan, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1600, 272 
Cal. Rptr. at 522. 
26. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 835 n.2., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215. 
27. Cal. Civ. Code § 7001 (West 1983). 
28. Nancy S. v. Michele G. 228 Cal. App. 3d at 836, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215. By refer-
ring to the existence of a legally recognized marriage, the court followed a rebuttable 
presumption in the state of California that a man who is legally married to a woman 
is the natural father of the children she bears during the marriage. (Cal. Civ. Code 
§ 7004(a)( 1) (West 1983). The court seemed to imply that if Appellant had contended 
that she and respondent had a legally recognized marriage it would have made a dif-
ference. This could be of notable importance as gay and lesbian relationships become 
more recognized by the Legislature and the courts. For example, in some cities, 
domestic partnership legislation allows lesbian and gay couples to officially register 
their relationships at City Hall. In San Francisco, health care benefits for city employ-
ees, previously only extended to the spouses of city employees, were recently extend-
ed to domestic partners. Perhaps as the concept of domestic partnerships becomes more 
widespread, a similar conclusive presumption of parentage would apply as to the chil-
dren born during the partnership. 
29. Cal. Civ. Code § 4600 (West 1983) is also known as the Family Law Act. 
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of the "best interests" of the child30. If one of the parties is 
unable to establish the status of parent, the determination to 
award custody to the non-parent will be reached based on a two-
prong test31. 
Therefore, if the court had granted Appellant the status of 
parent, she would have been entitled to seek custody and vis-
itation over the objections of the "natural" mother based sole-
lyon the "best interests" of the children. The determination 
that Appellant did not have the status of a parent meant that 
she had the additional burden of proving to the court that an 
award of sole custody to Respondent would be detrimental to 
the children32. The court articulated the two-pronged test, 
but did not apply it. 
D. THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINES. 
Appellant was unable to establish the status of parent 
under the UPA, but contended that the UPA did not provide the 
exclusive definition of a parent33. She asserted several legal 
theories: 1) de facto parent; 2) in loco parentis; and 3) parent 
by equitable estoppel, in support of her argument that as a "psy-
chological parent" both she and Respondent should stand on 
equal footing, as two legally recognized parents34. 
1. De Facto 
The court dismissed Appellant's argument that establish-
ing de facto parenthood would give her status of a parent. 
"These facts may well entitle [A]ppellant to the status of a 'de 
facto' parent. It does not, however, follow that as a 'de facto' 
parent [A]ppellant has the same rights as a parent to seek cus-
tody and visitation over the objection of the children's natural· 
mother."36 The court relied on In re B.G. 36, where it was held 
30. Cal. Civ. Code § 4600 (West 1983). Subsection (b) provides in pertinent part: 
"Custody should be awarded in the following order of pref-
erence according to the best interests of the child ... : (1) [t]o 
both parents jointly .... " 
31. Cal. Civ. Code § 4600 (West 1983). Subsection (c) provides in pertinent 
part: "Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or persons other 
that a parent, without the consent of the parents, [1] it shall make a finding that an 
award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child and [2] the award to 
a non-parent is required to serve the best interests of the child." 
32. Cal. Civ. Code § 4600 (c) (West 1983). 
33. Nancy S. 11. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 836, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215. 
34.Id. 
35. Id. at 837, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216. 
36. In re B.G., 11 Cal.3d 679, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974). 
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that de facto parents could not be awarded custody over the 
objections of the natural mother unless it were shown that cus-
tody to the natural mother would be detrimental to the child37• 
Thus, even if Appellant were to establish that she was a de facto 
parent, the two-prong test would still be applied. 
2. In Loco Parentis 
Next, Appellant asserted that the common law doctrine of 
"in loco parentis"38 could be applied to confer upon her the 
same rights as a parent to seek custody and visitation39• In loco 
parentis has been used in other contexts to confer parental 
rights and obligations on non-parents40• The court here, how-
ever, held that in loco parentis could not be applied in a cus-
tody context. The court relied on Perry v. Superior Court'l 
where in loco parentis was referred to in a custody/visitation 
context. Perry held that the trial court had no authority to 
award custody or visitation unless the minor was a "child of the 
marriage"'2. In a concurring opinion, Associate Justice Hopper 
suggested that if the "oo.[hlusband had raised the issue and had 
been found by the superior court to be in loco parentis with 
regard to the [childl, one could conclude that the [childl was a 
'child of the marriage' within Civil Code section 4351 ".s. The 
court cited Perry to illustrate that in loco parentis in a cus-
tody/visitation dispute has only been referred to as a way to 
establish that a minor was a child of the marriage for juris-
dictional purposes. The court refused to expand the doctrine to 
confer parental rights on a non-parent in a custody dispute. 
3. Equitable Estoppel/Equitable Adoption / Equitable Parent 
(a) Equitable Estoppel: 
Appellant next argued that Respondent should be estopped 
to deny the parent-child relationship between the children 
37. rd. at 692·95, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 456·58. 
38. In loco parentis is defined as: -[iln the place ofa parent; instead of a parent; 
charged, factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities." Black's Law 
Dictionary 896 (4th ed. 1968). 
39. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 838,279 Cal.Rptr. at 219. 
40. In Costello v. Hart, 23 Cal. App. 3d 898, 100 Cal. Rptr. 554 (1972), in loco par· 
entis was used to hold a non·parent liable, 88 a parent would have been, in a tort context. 
41. Perry v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 480, 166 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1980). 
42. Perry, 108 Cal. App. 3d at 481, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 584. Civil Code section 4351 
requires that the minor, whose custody is at issue, be a child of the marriage before 
the court can award custody or visitation. Cal. Civ. Code § 4351 (West 1983). 
43. Perry, 108 Cal. App. 3d at 484, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 586·87. (Associate Justice 
Hopper, concurring). 
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and Appellant because Respondent had encouraged and sup-
ported that relationship for many years, and now denied it in 
order to gain sole legal custody44. The court dismissed 
Appellant's argument relying on the fact that equitable estop-
pel had never before been used against a natural parent in a 
custody battle with a non- parent. 
The doctrine had, however, been used by natural mothers 
against nonbiological fathers to estop them from denying 
paternity in order to avoid child support obligations46• The court 
referred to a Wisconsin case, In re Paternity of D.L.H46, where 
the non-parent "father" was permitted to prove the elements 
of equitable estoppel in a paternity suit for custody and visi-
tation rights. However, the court, there, reserved the question 
of whether, even if he were able to establish the elements of 
equitable estoppel47, he would have attained the status of a par-
ent in a custody dispute. The court, here, distinguished the use 
of equitable estoppel in In re Paternity of D.L.H. 46, by noting 
that "the use of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, in these out-
of-state cases, is rooted in '[o]ne of the strongest presump-
tions in law, [i.e.], that a child born to a married woman is the 
legitimate child of her husband'''49, then added that no similar 
presumption applies here60• 
(b) Equitable ParentlEquitable Adoption: 
Next, the "court distinguishes the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel, asserted by Appellant, from the concept of an "equi-
table parent"61. Equitable parent was recognized in Michigan, 
in Atkinson v. Atkinson62 , a custody dispute where the husband, 
albeit the nonbiological father, was allowed to stand on equal 
footing against the natural mother of the child pursuant to the 
best interests of the child63• The court explained that "equitable 
44. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 839, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 217. 
45. In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal. App. 3d 848, 152 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1979); 
Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal. App. 2d 658,11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1961). 
46. In re Paternity ofD.L.H., 142 Wis. 2d 606, 419 N.W.2d 283 (1987). 
47. The elements ofequitable estoppel are set forth in In re Paternity ofD.L.H., 
142 Wis. 2d 606, 610, 419 N.W. 2d 283,286 (1987) as follows: 1) action or nonaction 
which induces 2) reliance by another 3) to his detriment. 
48. In re Paternity ofD.L.H, 142 Wis. 2d 606, 419 N.W.2d 283 (1987). 
49. Runner, Protecting A Husband's Parental Rights When His Wife Disputes The 
Presumption Of Legitimacy, 28 J. Fam. L. 116 (1989-90). 
50. Nancy S. v, Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 840, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 218. 
51. Id. at 840, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 218. 
52. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 160 Mich. App. 601, 408 N.W. 2d 516 (1987). 
53. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 840, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 218. 
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parent" differs from "equitable estoppel" in that "equitable 
parent" is related to the "equitable adoption" theory which oper-
ates for the purposes of inheritance by a child from the estate 
of a non-parent64• The Michigan court reasoned that if a "non-
parent" would be a "parent" in death (for inheritance purpos-
es), they ought to be a "parent" in life (for custody purposes)M. 
Though California, like Michigan recognizes "equitable adop-
tion" for inheritance purposes", it has declined in at least one 
other case to extend the concept to a custody proceeding&1. 
4. New Definition of Parenthood 
Appellant finally urged the court to adopt a broader defi-
nition of parenthood than the UPA to protect relationships 
between children and those who function as their parents. 
Under this proposed definition, the class of persons entitled to 
seek custody and visitation according to the same standards as 
a natural parent, would include "anyone who maintains a 
functional parental relationship with a child when a legally rec-
ognized parent created that relationship with the intent that 
the relationship be parental in nature"". The court refused to 
accept this expanded definition because it feared the complex 




The court relied on Curiale80 to illustrate that in some cus-
tody/visitation cases the problem is one of standing and juris-
diction. Though the opposite result was reached here, the 
court failed to distinguish the cases in a manner that 
54. rd. 
55. Atkinson, 160 Mich. App. at 605, 408 N.W.2d at 519. 
56. Cal.Prob.Code § 6408 (West 1983). 
57. In re Marriage of Lewis and Goetz, 203 Cal. App. 3d 514, 250 Cal. Rptr. 30 
(1988). The court declined to adopt the equitable parent theory to award a stepfather 
joint custody over the objection of the natural mother. The court declined to do this 
in large part because Civil Code § 4351.5, adopted only a few years prior, specifical-
ly governed the rights of a stepparent. The court also felt that it was better left to the 
legislature because of the Mcomplex practical, social and constitutional ramifica-
tions" of expanding the dass of persons entitled to assert parental rights. 
58. PolikofT, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to 
Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian·Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 
Georgetown L.J. 459,464 (1990). 
59. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 841,279 Cal. Rptr. at 219. 
60. Curiale v. Reagan, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1597,272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1990). 
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provides any insight or guidance to future cases. What remains 
are the following inferences: 1) there is no statutory basis for 
a lesbian partner to assert standing to sue a natural mother for 
custody, and thus, a court is precluded from having jurisdiction 
to decide the case61 when the nonbiological mother institutes the 
proceeding, and 2) when the natural mother institutes the pro-
ceeding, the court will only have jurisdiction to decide the case 
if the lesbian partner asserts that she is a parent62• 
B. Parental Status Determination Under the UPA. 
Upon determining that Appellant did not fit into the defi-
nition of a parent under the UPA, the court decided that she was 
a non-parent. This determination has tremendous legal sig-
nificance. Appellant, known as "Mom" in the eyes of the children, 
became a "stranger" in the eyes of the law. The UPA definition 
is extremely narrow. In order for a lesbian partner to claim any 
parental rights, she must adopt the children. Under the UPA, 
a person who adopts a child is a parent, and thus stands on equal 
footing with a natural parent in a custody/visitation dispute and 
can assert solely the best interests of the child standard. This 
would seem to be true whether the adoptive parent had partic-
ipated in the parenting since the child's birth or had only recent-
ly been acquainted with the child. Conversely, a person who has 
acted as a parent for eight years since birth, but has not formally 
adopted, as here, is unable to attain the status of parent under 
the UPA, and is unable to stand on equal footing with the nat-
ural parent. Thus, neither the duration nor the quality of the 
relationship bear any significance. 
The only route left for the non-parent is to establish 
parental status under equitable doctrines such as de facto 
parent or in loco parentis. However, even if she succeeds, her 
rights will still be subordinate to the natural mother. The 
courts seems resistant, no matter how unfair the result, to 
award custody/visitation to a non-parent over the objections of 
a "UP A parent". 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF UPA PARENTAL STATUS. 
The court dictates that the test to be applied is the two 
pronged "detriment to the childrenlbest interests of the 
children" test, but then does not apply it to the facts of this case. 
61. See Curiale v. Reagan, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1597, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1990). 
62. Nancy S. IJ. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 835 n.2, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215. 
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The court fails to examine the possibility that awarding sole 
custody to Repondent, with no visitation rights for Appellant, 
could be a detriment to the children and not in their best 
interests, because they would be denied the parental rela-
tionship with Appellant that they had both known since birth. 
This would be especially true for K. because she lived with both 
parties until she was five, and then with Appellant until she 
was eight. Both children had formed the kind of trusting and 
loving relationship with Appellant that children form with 
their parents. By denying the children contact with Appellant, 
they suffer the loss of this special, parent-like relationship. As 
to the second prong, Appellant might have contended that the 
best interests of the children would be most adequately served 
by having substantial contact with her; having two parent-type 
influences on the children would be better than only one. 
Furthermore, the court, in failing to do more than state the 
test, provides no guidance or clarity regarding what "detriment" 
means. Civil Code § 4600 (c) does not define detriment63 • 
Presumably, if a parent were found unfit for parenting, detri-
ment to the child would be obvious. But, arguably, if detriment 
were only capable of being established by a finding of unfitness, 
the statute would have stated this unequivocally. Possibly the 
Legislature envisioned that children could be detrimented in 
a variety of ways, even where a parent was found to be perfectly 
fit for parenting. 
In In re B.G.64, the California Supreme Court held that 
custody may be awarded to a non-parent despite the fact that 
the natural parent was expressly found fit to be a parent66• 
Clearly, unfitness is not a prerequisite to finding detriment to 
the children. Thus, the fact that Appellant did not contend that 
Respondent was unfit should not have rendered the issue 
moot, nor excused the court from applying the test. A rea-
sonable argument could have been made that the award of sole 
custody to Respondent was detrimental to the children, despite 
the fact that Respondent was not unfit, because the children 
would be denied their parent-like relationship with Appellant. 
63. Cal. Civ. Code § 4600 (c) (West 1983). 
64. In re B.G., 11 Cal.3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974). 
65. Id. at 681, l14 Cal. Rptr. at 445: Justice Tobriner, speaking for the Court, con-
cluded "that under [Civil Code section 4600] it is no longer essential that a court, to 
award custody to a non-parent, find the parent unfit to care for the child". 
The language Tobriner uses indicates that a finding of unfitness was previous-
ly required . 
. 
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Additionally, the court makes no distinction between cus-
tody and visitation rights, and essentially treats them as inex-
tricably entwined. Even if the court had applied the test and 
ultimately found that sole custody to Respondent would not 
meet the detriment requirement, a complete denial of visita-
tion rights to Appellant would certainly be a detriment. By 
holding that all further contact between the Appellant and the 
children must be by Respondent's consent, the court appears 
not even to have considered whether the children would be 
detrimented. "Reasonable visitation rights shall be awarded to 
a parent unless it is shown that such visitation would be detri-
mental to the best interests of the child. In the discretion of 
the court, reasonable visitation rights may be granted to any 
other person having an interest in the welfare of the child"66. 
By not granting custody rights or any reasonable visitation 
rights, which the court clearly has the discretion to do, it 
seems that the court has taken the position that the best 
interests of the children could not be served by a continuing 
relationship with a lesbian partner. By taking an all or noth-
ing approach, the court has taken away from S. and K. the per-
son whom they know as "Mom". Thus, the court appears also 
to have totally disregarded the second prong of the proposed 
test, the best interests of these children. 
D. THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINES. 
1. De Facto. 
The appellate court held that even if Appellant could estab-
lish de facto status she would still have to meet both prongs of 
the test, rendering her de facto status meaningless. The court, 
however, does not reach a conclusion regarding Appellant's de 
facto status, and thus did not apply the test. Interestingly, the 
court did indicate that Appellant would likely have been able to 
establish de facto status67. Its failure to reach a conclusion as to 
whether Appellant would qualify as a de facto parent combined 
with the court's total avoidance of applying the test supports an 
inference that the court believed that the Appellant's claim 
66. In re Halpern, 133 Cal. App. 3d 297, 305,184 Cal. Rptr. 740, 744 (1982), cit-
ing Cal. Civ. Code § 4601 (West 1983).[non- biological -father" unsuccessfully sought 
visitation rights with his ex-wife's minor child after she sought child support from him 
in the dissolution of their marriage]. 
67. -These facts may well entitle [Alppellant to the status of a 'de facto' parent .... " 
Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 840, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 216. 
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would certainly fail under the two-pronged test. This belief 
arguably stems from the court's bias underlying its entire anal-
ysis, that it would not be a detriment to the children to deny them 
all contact with a lesbian partner and that their best interests 
were not served by allowing their continued relationship with 
her. By failing to apply the test, the court suggests that such a 
conclusion is obvious. However, the court is hesitant to explic-
itly articulate its bias, possibly because it was uncertain of its 
ability to prevail on this position. 
Arguably, by avoiding ruling on whether Appellant was a 
de facto parent, the court was indirectly suggesting that apply-
ing the test would be futile. Alternatively, if a finding of de facto 
had been made, the court would have been required to justify 
the denial of contact between two children and the person 
they call "Mom" as being in the children's best interest, and to 
show that it was not to their detriment. 
2. In Loco Parentis. 
The court quickly dispensed with Appellant's in loco par-
entis argument by holding that since the doctrine had never 
been applied to confer parental rights on a non-parent in a cus-
tody dispute before, it could not be done. The Perry88 court, 
being dissatisfied with the result in the case, invited the 
Legislature to address the concerns of step-parents who estab-
lish close relationships with their stepchildren. The Legislature 
did so by enacting Civil Code section 4351.589, providing a 
limited form of visitation rights for stepparents. In contrast, 
this court did not expressly invite the Legislature to address 
the concerns of lesbian and gay parents. 
3. Equitable Estoppel/Equitable Parent / Equitable Adoption. 
(a) Equitable Estoppel: 
The reasoning here was much like the in loco parentis 
analysis. Equitable estoppel had been applied to impose 
support obligations on a husband who represented to his 
wife's children that he was their natural father, and then 
sought to deny paternity for the purpose of avoiding support 
obligations70• The court held that equitable estoppel may be 
68. Perry v. Superior, 108 Cal. App. 3d 480,166 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1980). 
69. Cal. Civ. Code § 4351.5 (West 1983). 
70. In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal.App. 3d 848, 152 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1979) and 
Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal.App.2d 658, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1961). 
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appropriately applied against a non-parent to make them pay 
support as a parent would71. On the other hand, the court holds 
that a non-parent may not use equitable estoppel against a par-
ent to seek visitation or custody. The court does not justify why 
the doctrine can only be applied against a non-parent, but 
simply asserts that it does not work reciprocally in the non-par-
ent's favor. If a non- parent can unwillingly be made a parent 
in the eyes of the law, there should also be ways for the non-
parent to establish parenthood under the same circumstances. 
Again, the court is content with relying on the fact that the doc-
trine has never before been applied in California in the cus-
tody/visitation context, and therefore cannot be applied here. 
The court cites, In re Paternity of D.L.H.72, where in a very 
progressive step the court allowed a non-parent to seek custody 
by trying to establish equitable estoppel. The Wisconsin court 
recognized that rights of parenthood might be judicially grant-
ed without legislative permission. In an effort to avoid read-
ing this decision as based on sound equitable policy, which then 
it would have to justify not following here, the court here 
attributed this progressive judicial posture in D.L.H. to the 
antiquated, patriarchal presumption that the husband is the 
father73 • 
(b) Equitable ParentlEquitable Adoption: 
The court then goes on to distinguish the equitable estop-
pel doctrine from the "equitable parent" concept. The "equitable 
parent" concept was recognized in Michigan in a divorce pro-
ceeding to permit the husband/non-biological father to obtain 
the status of a parent in a custody dispute with the natural 
mother, and to have the dispute settled as between two natu-
ral parents: according to the child's best interests 7.. The court 
distinguished Appellant's equitable estoppel theory from the 
Atkinson "equitable parent" theory, noting that the latter is 
rooted in a statutory recognition of the "equitable adoption" the-
ory for purposes of intestate succession76• California and 
Michigan courts recognize the doctrine of "equitable adop-
tion" which allows a child to take an intestate share in a per-
son's estate who was not their parent, but who acted like one?s. 
71. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 839, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 218. 
72. In re Paternity ofD.L.H., 142 Wis. 2d 606, 419 N.W.2d 283 (1987). 
73. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 840, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 218. 
74. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 160 Mich. App. 601, 408 N.W.2d 516 (1987). 
75. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 840, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 218. 
76. Cal. Prob. Code § 6408 (West 1983). 
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However, in Atkinson, the court was willing to recognize the 
reciprocity of that theory: "[i]f a person would be a parent in death, 
they should be considered a parent in life"77. The Michigan 
court adopted this doctrine of "equitable parent" and held that 
a husband who is not the biological father of a child born or 
conceived during the marriage may be considered the natural 
father of that child where (1) the husband and the child mutu-
ally acknowledge a relationship as father and child or the moth-
er of the child has cooperated in the development of such a 
relationship over a period of time prior to the filing of the com-
plaint for divorce; (2) the husband desires to have the rights 
afforded to a parent; and (3) the husband is willing to take on the 
responsibility of paying child support78. 
Though California statutorily recognizes "equitable adop-
tion"79, it has not yet recognized "equitable parent." The court 
here refers to one other case that has declined to adopt the 
"equitable parent" theoryBO. However, In re Marriage of Lewis and 
Goetz8 ! is distinguishable from the case at bar because the 
Legislature had enacted Civil Code § 4351.582 which specifical-
ly addressed the right of stepparents to seek a limited award of 
visitation. Here, there is no statute that addresses lesbian fam-
ilies. The court ignores the distinction, and defers to the 
Legislature once again, taking refuge behind the shield of the 
"complex practical, social, and constitutional ramifications" of 
expanding the class of persons entitled to assert parental rights83• 
4. New Definition of Parenthood 
Based on its treatment of the equitable arguments 
Appellant had already asserted, it was not surprising that 
the court refused to accept this argument. Arguably, if the court 
had wanted to find that Appellant was entitled to some parental 
rights based on her relationship to the children, it would have 
done so before reaching this issue. This argument however 
would have provided a sound policy basis for the court to con-
clude that Appellant was entitled to visitation rights or shared 
custody. 
77. Atkinson, 160 Mich. App. at 605, 408 N.W.2d at 518. 
78. [d. at 605, 408 N.W.2d at 518. 
79. Cal. Prob. Code § 6408 (West 1983). 
80. In re Marriage of Lewis and Goetz, 203 Cal.App.3d 514, 250 Cal. Rptr. 30 
(1988). 
81. [d. 
82. Cal. Civ. Code § 4351.5 (West 1983). 
83. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d at 840,279 Cal. Rptr. at 219. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The outcome of this case underscores the legal void in 
which lesbians and gay men frequently find themselves, and 
the heavy price we pay for being outside the mainstream. 
Non-traditional families are not afforded the same kinds of pro-
tection that other, traditional families are. The Legislature 
needs to address the realities of contemporary life. In the 
absence of clear guidelines, gay men and lesbians are not able 
to protect themselves from devastating results such as this one. 
The lack oflegislation does not deter the non-traditional fam-
ily from existing; it only leads to more litigation and incon-
sistent outcomes. As long as the law requires that a child can 
only have two natural parents, one of each sex, and grants them 
all the attendant rights of parenthood, while granting others 
none, non- traditional families will suffer the agony and humil-
iation of legal nonexistence. For lesbian and gay families, 
the ideal solution would be to revise the Uniform Parentage Act, 
expanding its definition of parent. The revision would need to 
address lesbian and gay parents, and also other non-tradi-
tional families such as foster parents and stepparents. The lan-
guage of the revision would need to be broad to address the 
diversity of circumstances. However, there is another con-
sideration. All parents, traditional and otherwise, would prob-
ably agree that the definition of parent should not become so 
broad as to undermine the policy that those who are parents 
should be afforded special rights. If nearly anyone could claim 
parental status under the revised UPA definition, there would 
not be any point in having a UPA. No parent would want to find 
themselves being called into a custody battle over their child, 
with the neighbor, the baby sitter, or the teacher at school. The 
effort to revise the UPA should be concentrated on striking the 
balance between generality, to allow legitimate claims, and 
specificity, to exclude all others. 
Michael Weiss* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993. 
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B. SURROGATE PARENTING 
1. In the absence of parental preference, the best interests 
of the child control custody decisions. 
Adoption of Matthew B. 232 Cal. App. 3d 1239, 284 Cal. 
Rptr. 18 (1991). Adoption of Matthew B.l is the first case 
focusing on surrogate parenting that has reached the Appellate 
level in the California Court system. As such, it can be expect-
ed to have importance in future cases. The importance of this 
case, however, does not lie in the court's ruling on issues inher-
ent to surrogate parenting as the court's judgement was pri-
marily dependent upon procedural issues. The real importance 
of Adoption of Matthew B. lies in the court's dictum. This 
may be viewed as an indication of how the courts will decide 
cases of this type until legislation is enacted to fill the widen-
ing gulf created by the techno-medical advances in the field of 
infertility treatment. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1984, appellant Nancy B. contacted the Center for 
Reproductive Alternatives expressing an interest in becoming 
a surrogate mother.3 According to Nancy's application, her pri-
mary motivation was a desire to have a positive birth experi-
ence and "to give the gift of a child to a couple that could not 
otherwise have children".3 She expressed strong feelings 
against becoming a single mother and did not want the respon-
sibility of raising a child.· 
Nancy and the Respondent, M's, were first introduced at the 
Center for Reproductive Alternatives in April of 1985.6 At 
their next meeting in May of 1985, the provisions and legal con-
siderations of a proposed surrogate parenting contract were dis-
cussed in great detail.6 Subsequent to that discussion, Nancy 
met with a private attorney who had been hired for her but paid 
for by the M's.7 The terms of the contract specified Timothy M. 
as the natural father and his wife Charlotte as the adopting 
mother.8 After discussions which included the potential 
1. Adoption of Matthew B., 232 Cal. App. 3d 1239,284 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1991). 
2. Id. at 1251. 
3.ld. 
4.ld. 
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illegality and unenforceability of the contract, and after sev-
eral modifications were made at her request, Nancy signed the 
contract in June of 1985.9 
Nancy became pregnant and delivered a boy, Matthew, 
nine months later on September 1, 1986}O Nancy designated 
Timothy as the father on the birth certificate and signed a form 
authorizing the hospital to release Matthew to the M.'s, citing 
the purpose as adoption planning. ll On September 23, 1986 
Timothy filed a paternity action and a judgment was entered 
by stipulation declaring Timothy to be Matthew's father and 
granting him sole custody.12 
Charlotte filed a petition for stepparent adoption on 
September 25.13 On November 13, 1986, Nancy presented 
Charlotte with a signed consent to Charlotte's adoption of 
Matthew. 14 The occasion also marked Nancy's first contact 
with Matthew since Timothy and Charlotte took the baby 
home from the hospital. 16 
In late February of 1987 the relationship between Nancy 
and the M's began to deteriorate and the M's decided that it was 
no longer in Matthew's best interest to allow Nancy to continue 
contact with him.18 
Nancy filed a petition on July 2,1987 seeking to withdraw 
her consent to the stepparent adoption and seeking periods of 
custody of Matthew. 17 At the close of hearings Nancy moved to 
amend her petition and she moved to vacate the paternity 
judgement. IS Both motions were denied.19 Although the case 
of Adoption of Matthew B. consolidates both appeals, this 
paper will be concerned only with the petition to withdraw con-
sent to the stepparent adoption. 
II. ANALYSIS 
California Civil Code § 226a addresses the matter of a nat-
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child. In pertinent part § 226a states: "Once given, consent of 
the natural parent to the adoption of the child by the person 
or persons to whose adoption of the child the consent was 
given, may not be withdrawn except with court approval. tt20 For 
approval to be granted, two conditions must be met; first, with-
drawal must be reasonable in view of all the circumstances and 
second, it must be in the best interests of the child.21 
A. REASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
Substantial discretion is vested in the trial court due to the 
intangibility of the values that are reflected in the requirements 
for withdrawal. These intangibles include in part, "the 
demeanor, attitudes, intonation, sincerity, and personality of the 
witnesses as well as more exact concerns as to the relative fit-
ness of the parties, educationaL. opportunities for the child, the 
emotional and love attachments the parties have for the child 
and the child's mental and physical health. "22 Its decision may 
be reversed only on a finding of an abuse of discretion, that is, 
only if the decision was not supported by substantial evidence.23 
1. Illegality of the contract 
The appellate court found no merit in Nancy's argument on 
the illegality of the contract for two reasons. First, the ques-
tion of illegality was not raised in the original petition.24 
Section 226a requires that petitions for withdrawal of consent 
"shall be in writing and shall set forth the reasons for with-
drawal..."26 Nancy's original petition did not ever allege the 
existence of a surrogate contract. The appellate court held that 
as a result of this failure to comply with § 226a, the trial court 
properly refused to decide the issue of illegality of the surro-
gate parenting contract. 
Secondly even if the issue had been raised, it would not have 
helped Nancy's argument.2S After finding that there was no 
need to determine the illegality of the surrogate parenting 
20. CAL. CIV. CODE § 226(a) (amended 1988, repealed 1991, current version CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 227.46)(West Supp. 1992). 
21. 1d. 
22. 1d., citing, Guardianship of Baby Boy M., 66 Cal. App. 3d 254, at 267,135 Cal. 
Rptr. 866 (1977). (Appeal from a holding that allowed the natural mother to withdraw 
her consent to adoption. Affirmed.) 
23. Matthew B., 232 Cal. App. 3d 1239 at 1254. 
24. 1d. at 1255. 
25. CAL. CIV. CODE supra note 23, at 6. 
26. 1d. 
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contract, the Court went on to state the insignificance of the 
issue of illegality to the case at hand. Applying traditional con-
tract law, it stated "[c]ourts generally will not assist parties who 
seek to obtain relief by showing they entered into an illegal 
transaction. "27 Furthermore, "courts will not intercede where 
the parties have fully performed under the illegal contract"28 
and where "the parties assumed the risk of illegality in enter-
ing into the contract."29 
This dicta is significant because of the C,ourt's specula-
tion as to the outcome had the contract been found to be ille-
gal. Based on the premise that primary consideration should 
be given to public policy and how it would best be served, the 
Court found the overriding interest to be that of Matthew's wel-
fare. With that in mind the court stated: 
[A] ruling that the surrogate contract's 
alleged illegality automatically vitiates the 
consent, regardless of whether it was oth-
erwise freely given, would deprive the court 
of the power to order an adoption it found to 
be in Matthew's best interests, and would 
fail to preserve the integrity of the only fam-
ily he has ever known.30 
Citing Stewart v. Stewart, the court thus concluded that "the 
best interests "of the child control custody determinations, 
regardless of the parties agreement. "31 
2. Use of stepparent adoption procedure 
Nancy's second argument contended that the stepparent 
adoption procedure was unavailable in this instance. She 
stated that section 7005(b)32 of the Uniform Parentage Act in 
27. [d., citing, Hooper v. Barranti, 81 Cal. App. 2d 570, at 576, 184 F.2d 688 
(1947). (Action for dissolution ofa partnership.) 
28. [d., citing, Denning v. Taber, 70 Cal. App. 2d 253, at 258-259,160 P.2d 900 
(1945). (Action for an accounting of partnership property.) 
29. [d., citing, Guthrie v. Times·Mirror Co., 51 Cal. App. 3d 879, at 885, 124 Cal. 
Rptr. 577 (1975). (Action by seller for recision of contract.) 
30. [d. at 1258. 
31. [d., citing, Stewart v. Stewart, 130 Cal. App. 2d 186, at 193, 278 P.2d 441 (1955). 
(Custody case involving the children of divorced parents. Stipulation by the parties as 
to custody did not prohibit the admission of evidence as to the mother's fitness.) 
32. CAL. Crv. CODE §7005(b) drafted to protect married women using artifical 
insemination provides "[tlhe donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use 
in artificial insemination ofa woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as 
if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived." (West 1983). 
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the California Civil Code prevented Timothy from being 
Matthew's father and thus rendered the paternity judgment 
void. The appellate court rejected Nancy's claims.33 
The court, as above, found that Nancy's original petition did 
not allege problems with the paternity judgment, Timothy is 
referred to throughout the petition as "the natural father". 
Secondly, "the judgment or order of the court determining the 
existence or nonexistence of the parent and child relation-
ship is determinative for all purposes"·34 Thus, Nancy's chal-
lenge was prohibited by collateral estoppel. 
3. Knowledge of her rights 
Nancy's third argument was that she did not know her 
rights and did not have independent counsel. On appeal, sub-
stantial evidence was found to support the trial court's rejection 
of this argument. It was held that the consent form itself pro-
vided sufficient notice of Nancy's rights. The consent form 
warned that the court's execution would deprive Nancy of all cus-
tody rights, that court approval would be needed to withdraw, 
and also indicated a place to call if she had any questions. 36 
Nancy's claim that she lacked independent counsel was 
also dismissed. Although her attorney for the contract signing 
was paid for by the M's, the evidence showed that he acted inde-
pendently and on Nancy's behalf. In reaching this conclusion 
the court pointed to the numerous changes made to the contract 
at Nancy's request.38 
Finally, Nancy testified that she had contacted counsel 
whenever she thought it necessary. In fact, prior to signing the 
consent form, Nancy had consulted with another attorney 
regarding a malpractice suit against the Center.37 At no time 
33. In so deciding. the court denied Nancy the same protection that is given to 
married women under § 7005. Perhaps the court is merely reflecting the societal value 
placed on having two parents, perhaps the message to women runs deeper. At any rate, 
single women going through reproductive clinics who thought they were protected from 
paternity suits by sperm donors under § 7005(b), cannot count on being protected under 
this court's reasoning. 
34. Matthew B. 232 Cal. App. 3d 1239, citing, County of San Diego v. Hotz, 168 Cal. 
App. 3d 605, at 608,214 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1985). (Appeal from an order requiring appel-
lant to submit to blood testing to determine the probability of his being father of child 
conceived by wife during marriage. Held, contest precluded by collateral estoppel.) 
35. [d., at 1260. 
36. [d. at 1261. 
37. This suit was against the Center for Reproductive Alternatives regarding mal-
practice in connection with treatment to facilitate Nancy's pregnancy. 
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did Nancy choose to consult an attorney regarding the consent 
to adoption. 
4. Promise of visitation. 
Nancy's final argument, that withdrawal of consent was rea-
sonable under the circumstances, charged the trial court with 
error in finding that the M's had not made a false promise of 
visitation and for finding that Nancy did not rely on that 
promise of contact prior to signing the consent. The appellate 
court, citing three factors, upheld the trial court ruling. 
First, there was the surrogate contract itself. In the con-
tract Nancy warranted a lack of desire on her part to have a 
parent-child relationship with the child that would be born.38 
Secondly, and most damaging was a provision that had been 
modified at Nancy's request. That provision, as requested by 
Nancy, stipulated that she would "not seek to view the infant 
[c]hild after the child leaves the hospital".89 Third, several let-
ters written by Nancy supported the finding that she under-
stood that there would be no visitation with the child in the 
future. 40 In light of this evidence, and a provision in the con-
tract requiring that amendments be in writing, the trial court 
rejected Nancy's claim of an unwritten modification. 
B. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
The second test that a petition to withdraw consent must 
pass is that the withdrawal must be in the best interests of the 
child. Best interest, like the above reasonable under the 
circumstances test, rests on a number of intangible factors. 
Again, the trial court could only be reversed only if there was 
clear abuse of discretion. The best interest standard does not 
compare a situation to an absolute, rather it holds it in com-
parison to an available alternative; here, the M's versus 
Nancy.4! 
As a result of signing the consent to adoption, Nancy lost 
the preference given to natural parents. That loss was 
38. Matthew B. 232 Cal. App. 3d 1239 at 1262. 
39.1d. 
40.1d. 
41. 1d., citing, Adoption of Michelle T., 44 Cal. App. 3d 699, at 707,117 Cal. Rptr. 
856, 84 A.L.R. 3d 654 (1975). (Appeal from judgment denying petition for custody. 
Proposed parents were 71 and 55 years of age. Held, Superior Court abused its dis-
cretion by denying petition solely on the basis of age. Reversed with directions.) 
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critical in that it shifted the burden to Nancy, to make a pos-
itive showing that withdrawal would be in Matthew's best 
interests.42 The court, focusing on Matthew's bonding and need 
for stability, and on the relative fitness of the parties as par-
ents, held that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial 
court's decision that withdrawal of consent would not be in 
Matthew's best interest. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In his conclusion Justice Chin, writing for the majority, 
summarized the potential problems in this area of law: 
Surrogacy raises many constitutional, pub-
lic policy, and human questions that we do 
not discuss in this opinion. It is, of course, 
for the Legislature to consider these impor-
tant questions and provide answers through 
legislative action ... Absent legislative guid-
ance, the courts of necessity will ultimately 
be called upon to determine the questions 
associated with surrogacy ... 43 
In the absence of guidance from the Legislature, the implica-
tion is clear that these cases will continue to be resolved by 
looking to the best interests of the child. This is as it should 
be, and undoubtedly will prove to be in the best interests of 
society as a whole. 
Problems arise in cases where the mother has not signed a 
consent to adoption, and therefore has not lost the parental 
preference. In those cases custody by the mother must be 
shown to be detrimental to the child, not merely against the 
best interests of the child. It is in this type of case where the 
cout:'ts, without legislation, must struggle with the ethics of 
applying traditional contract law as an alternative. 
Surrogate parenting and its related issues are highly 
charged and emotionally sensitive areas, reaching the very 
42. Id., citing, Adoption of Jenny L., 111 Cal. App. 3d 422, at 429, 168 Cal. 
Rptr. 695 (1980). (Appeal from judgment allowing natural mother to withdraw con-
sent to adoption. Held, trial court applied the wrong standard when it failed to 
determine best interest of the child. Instead, the trial court had applied the parental 
preference standard which requires only that withdrawal not be detrimental to the 
child. Reversed and remanded with directions.) 
43. 1d. at 1273-1274. 
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foundations of our beliefs in the fundamental rights to pro-
create and parent. The absence of legislative guidance will 
inevitably result in many inequities due to the highly dis-
cretionary nature of decisions on these issues. At this point 
in time, the consequences of choosing surrogate parenting 
are impossible to guarantee. The potential cost both to 
society and to the individuals involved is great and it is up to 
the Legislature to act now in providing guidance .... 
Susan M. Crocker* 
44. As this note goes to press, Senator Diane Watson has introduced the 
Alternative Reproduction Act. Already passed by the Senate and now before the 
Assembly Judiciary Committee, the bill would legalize paid surrogacy [either preg-
nancy through artificial insemination or implantation of a fertilized egg] and paid egg 
donations [for in vitro fertilization]. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993. 
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C. ADOPTION 
1. An adopted child does not have a fundamental right 
to a family. 
Adoption of Kay C., 228 Cal. App. 3d 741,_Cal. Rptr._ 
(1991). In the Adoption of Kay C.,l the California Court of 
Appeals held that an adopted child does not have a funda-
mental right to a family, nor are the mentally ill a suspect class 
requiring a strict scrutiny analysis. Instead, the court held that 
an adoptive child has only the amount of rights as bestowed by 
the adoption statutes.2 
FACTS 
At six years old, Kay C.'s natural parents became unable to 
care for her and Kay was placed with foster parents. After two 
years, Kay's natural parent's relinquished all rights to her, 
making Kay eligible for adoption. 
When the adopting parents (respondents) became interested 
in Kay, they requested all available information on her back-
ground. However, they never received certain reports sug-
gesting Kay should remain with her foster parents. One court 
appointed evaluator recommended to the Department of Social 
Services3 that Kay stay with her foster parents because the 
secure relationship was important for Kay.· In fact, Kay her-
self asked to remain with the foster family.6 Instead, the 
Department of Social Services followed the recommendation of 
Dr. Albert DeRanieri, Kay's therapist, who decided she was 
ready for adoption.6 
For unstated reasons, the adopting parent's anticipated Kay 
might have trouble adjusting to a new home. While they were 
willing to help Kay make the transition to her new life with 
them, the adopting parents were unwilling to adopt a child with 
1. Adoption ofKsy C., 228 Cal. App. 3d 741, _ Cal.Rptr. _ (1991). 
2. Id. at 753·54. 
3. The Department of Social Services for the State of California makes decisions 
concerning whether children should be placed for adoption. A licensed agency, in this 
case The Children's Home Society of California, actually places the children with 
prospective parents. 
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severe emotional problems, "specifically a psychotic or vio-
lent child".7 
Kay and her adoptive family regularly attended therapy ses-
sions to help Kay adjust to her new environment. Despite these 
sessions, Kay's behavior became increasingly erratic and 
unpredictable. Several months before the finalization of the 
adoption, Kay was diagnosed as having a borderline personality 
disorder with psychological defenses of splitting, projection and 
denial. 8 Again, the adopting parents were never told of the 
extent of Kay's psychological problem until after the final 
adoption decree.9 
Two years after the adoption, Kay was diagnosed as psy-
chotic, and she exhibited paranoid, delusional thinking. lo Kay 
began accusing her new parents of child abuse and threatened 
to call the police. II Kay also accused her adoptive mother of try-
ing to choke her.12 Respondents became unable to handle 
Kay's increasingly unstable behavior. Consequently, Kay was 
placed in a horne for emotionally disturbed children. IS 
Respondent's sought to abrogate the adoption under 
California Civil Code section 227b, which permits vacation of 
an adoption in certain situations. I. The statute directs the 
adoptive parents to present evidence that the child had a 
"developmental disability or a mental illness as a result of con-
ditions prior to the adoption to such an extent that the child 
cannot be relinquished to an adoption agency on the grounds 
that the child is considered unadoptable."J6 The statute also 
requires that the parents had no knowledge or notice of the con-
dition prior to the final decree and that the petition for vaca-
tion be filed within five years of the entry of the final decree. IS 
COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The trial court found Kay C. did have serious mental pro-




10. Id. at 747. 
11. Id. at 746. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 747. 
14. Cal. Civ. Code § 228.10 (227b renumbered with change by statutes 1990, 
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also decided the respondents did not have knowledge or notice 
of her condition, Kay's mental problems rendered her unadopt-
able and finally it was in Kay's best interest that the adoption 
be vacated. 17 The criterion the court used for determining best 
interest includes, consideration of "the welfare of the child, the 
extent, nature, duration and prognosis as to the disability of 
the child, the degree of dependency, the length of the adoption, 
and the bonds of affection or attachment. "18 
Kay asserts that section 227b violates both the due process 
and the equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment. Kay 
maintains she is entitled to a strict scrutiny analysis because 
she has a fundamental right to a family and because her men-
tal illness places her in suspect class. 
The California Court of Appeals rejected both of Kay's 
arguments. First, the court examined whether an adoptive 
child has a fundamental right in the family unit. The court 
concluded that natural children and parents have a funda-
mental right in the family unit. 19 However, the court refused 
to extend this right to include adoptive children.2D The court 
stated, that "under certain circumstances, an adoptive child, 
like the natural child has a liberty interest in his or her fam-
ily relationship. "21 However, the court found that section 227b 
does not trespass on any of Kay's fundamental rights to fam-
ily. The court reasoned the creation of Kay's relationship with 
her adoptive family was statutory and contractual. 
Consequently, her potential fundamental rights could not 
extend to termination proceedings which are also statutory. 
The court stressed that statutory rights do not create fun-
damental rights. 22 While in contrast, the court found the bio-
logical family, is not based in state law, but "in intrinsic human 
rights," there is an adequate basis for the distinction between 
natural and adoptive family rights.23 
17. Kay, 228 Cal App. 3d at 747. 
18. Id. at 752 (citing Department of Social Welfare v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 
I, 6, 8 Cal. Rptr. 354,459 P.2d 897 (1969». 
19. See Moore v. East Cleveland 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977): Smith v. City of 
Fontina, 818 F.2d. 1411 (9th Cir. 1987). 
20. Kay, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 750. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 749-50 (citing Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U. S. at 503.) The Claimed inter-
est derives from a knowingly assumed contractual relation with the state, it is appro-
priate to ascertain from state law the expectations and entitlement of the parties. Id. 
23. Kay, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 749 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503). 
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The court emphasized adoption is not a common law concept, 
but instead an idea contemplated by statute and contract.24 
Looking carefully at the criteria required for a legal adoption, 
the court found, "(T)he proceeding is essentially one of contract 
between the parties whose consent is required. "26 The judiciary 
oversees that the criteria is properly executed.28 
Continuing with the idea that the adoption relationship is 
contractual, the court referred to section 227b as the "the leg-
islative perceived equivalent of mistake ... ".27 The court 
observed that other sections of the adoption code allow for 
vacation of the adoption, if the termination of the natural 
parents rights were obtained through fraud, duress or mis-
take.28 Extending this reasoning to the adoptive parents, the 
court found that they were deprived all the relevant informa-
tion concerning Kay's condition, "which if·known would have 
affected their agreement to adopt."29 The court declared that 
parents need all available information to make a decision and 
if the information is not provided, "Section 227b serves retro-
spectively to remedy this gap in the vital information pro-
cess."30 The court found this was a valid reason for maintaining 
section 227b. 
The court also dismissed Kay's equal protection argument. 
Kay contended that section 227b discriminates against devel-
opmentally disabled and mentally ill adopted children.3t Kay 
argued the mentally ill form a suspect class and deserve the 
protection of strict scrutiny. 
Rejecting Kay's argument for strict scrutiny, the court 
relied on the United States Supreme Court decision, Cleburne 
v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 32 which held mentally 
retarded persons are not a suspect class. The court in Cleburne 
24. Kay, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 750. 
25.Id. 
26. Id. (citing Estate of Taggert, 190 Cal. 493,498,213 P. 504 (1923). The criterion 
used by the court in Taggert is as follows: 1. That the person adopting is ten years older 
than the child, 2. that all the parties whose consent is required do consent, fully and 
freely, to the making of such contract, 3 that the adoption contemplated by the con-
tract will be for the best interest of the child. Id. 




31. Id. at 753. Kay asserts that since the statute doesn't apply to physically ill 
or emotionally healthy adopted children that the statute is discriminatory. 
32. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,445-46 (1985). 
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reasoned, "it would be too difficult to find a principled way to 
distinguish a variety of groups who have perhaps immutable 
disabilities ... One need only mention this in respect to the 
aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. "S3 Further 
the court intoned that no other California court had ever found 
the mentally ill formed a suspect class." 
Kay also claimed her interest in family was a fundamental 
right under the equal protection clause thus requiring strict 
scrutiny. Kay argued the principles used by the California 
Supreme Court to hold education as a fundamental right under 
the equal protection clause of the California Constitution, 
should be extended to the adoptive family relationship.36 Without 
further discussion, the court again firmly stated that Kay's 
rights were limited to those found in the adoption statutes. 58 
Dismissing a strict scrutiny analysis because neither a fun-
damental right nor a suspect class were at stake, the court 
employed the rational relation test of minimal scrutiny. Using 
the rational relation test, the court explained it "must determine 
whether the Legislature could have reasonably found the chal-
lenged classification would promote a legitimate state interest."37 
The court determined that the legislative purpose of section 
227b is to promote adoption, "and thus promote the welfare of 
children available for adoption. "38 The court found this was a 
legitimate state interest. 
Kay protested that no evidence showed the statute actually 
promoted adoption.39 Having determined that section 227b's 
purpose was valid, the court stated they were not required to 
look into whether the statute successfully fulfilled its 
purpose. 40 The court also commented that the specific 
33. Id. at 445-56. 
34. Kay, 228 Cal.App.3d at 753-754. See In He Eugene W., 29 Cal App. 3d 623, 105 
Cal. Rptr. 736 (1972), The court stated the distinction between physical and mental ill-
ness is "amply warranted" by reason of the differing nature of the two disabilities. 
35. Kay, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 753-54. 
36.Id. 
37. Id. at 754 (citing Western & Southern L.I. Co. v. Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 
648, 671-72 (1981». 
38. Kay, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 755 (citing Department of Social Welfare, 1 Cal.3d 
at 6.) 
39. Kay, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 755. 
40. Id. at 755 (citing Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co. 449 U.S. 456, 466, 
(1981). "the constitutionality of a measure under the equal protection clause does not 
depend on a court's assessment of the empirical success or failure of a measures pro-
visions.-) 
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provisions of section 227b, such as the five year statute of 
limitations, and the requirement that the mental illness exist 
prior to the adoption were extremely reasonable. 
Finally, the court observed that while adoption codes are 
designed to further children's interests, prospective parents 
must also be given consideration. The court examined the 
various factors adopting parents need to evaluate when decid-
ing whether to adopt and or terminate the adoption." The court 
found the ability to form emotional bonds was paramount and 
determinative of whether a relationship should be initiated or 
continued.42 The court noted some parents, though aware of 
section 227b may chose to continue the relationship with the 
child, but in other cases, setting aside the relationship might 
be best for all parties.43 For Kay, the court found setting aside 
her adoption was best. 
CONCLUSION 
In support of the court's abrogation ofthe adoption is the fact 
that Kay may be more harmed by staying with a family who 
doesn't want her. The court emphasized that adopting parents 
could not form an emotional bond with Kay. However, left unad-
dressed are Kay's emotional needs. For determining Kay's best 
interest, the court relied on the trial court's discretion." Yet, how 
the trial court applied the best interest test of Department of 
Social Welfare46 remains unclear. In this situation there does not 
appear to be any good solutions, and regardless of the court's 
decision, Kay's future seems bleak. 
Theresa M. Kolish * 
41. Kay, 228 Cal. App. 3d. at 756. 
42. [d. 
43. [d. 
44. [d. at 752. 
45. See supra note 18. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993. 
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V. INSURANCE LAW 
A. RATE DISCRIMINATION 
1. Insurance Companies are required to cover female 
insureds for pregnancy and childbirth but are allowed 
to rely on questionably discriminatory methods when 
pricing these policies. 
Kirsh v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co., 233 Cal. App. 
3d 84, 284 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1991). In Kirsh v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company, t the California Court of Appeal 
reversed a Superior Court grant of summary judgment in favor 
of the defendant State Farm Automobile Insurance Company. 
The Court of Appeal found that defendant's challenged pricing 
policy was permissible.2 Although this policy, on its face, violated 
the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh Act)S, the court held that the 
more specific anti-discrimination statute found in the Insurance 
Code· superseded the Unruh Act.5 The court reached this con-
clusion because the Insurance Code applied specifically to 
rates charged by insurance companies.6 
The court did find that the insurance company violated the 
Unruh Act when it omitted coverage for costs of normal preg-
nancy and childbirth from the health insurance policy issued 
to the plaintiff.? 
FACTS 
Plaintiff was 36 years old when she first purchased a hos-
pital-surgical policy and catastrophic rider from defendant. 6 At 
that time the policy premium was $564.60 per 6 month period 
as opposed to $344.90 if the policy had been issued to a man 
similarly situated.9 This price disparity continued throughout 
the plaintiff's five year period of coverage. to Because plaintiff's 
1. Kirsh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 233 Cal. App. 3d 84, 284 Cal. Rptr. 
260 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (modified) 
2. 1d. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr 265. 
3. Cal. Civil Code §51 (West 1982) 
4. Cal. Ins. Code §10140 (West 1972) 
5. Higher premiums were charged to plaintiff, a woman, than to a man similarly 
situated. Kirsh, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 88, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 264 
6. Kirsh, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 92, 284 Cal Rptr. at 265 
7. 1d. at 92,284 Cal. Rptr at 266. 
8. 1d. at 88, 284 Cal. Rptr at 262. 
9. 1d. at 88, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 262. 
10. 1d. at 88, 284 cal. Rptr at 262. 
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policy did not include coverage for normal pregnancy and 
childbirth, defendant offered plaintiff a pregnancy rider for an 
additional $633.00 per six month period. 11 Plaintiff declined this 
rider. 12 
Plaintiff challenged as arbitrary discrimination two of the 
insurance company's practices: 1) charging women higher pre-
miums than men, and 2) excluding coverage for pregnancy and 
childbirth from policies issued to women while omitting no con-
ditions which are unique to men 13 from policies issued to men. 14 
Defendant responded with three arguments which it alleged 
permitted it to disparately price: 1) the Unruh Act does not 
apply to the life and disability insurance industry because an 
insurance company is not a business establishment within 
the meaning of the Unruh Act, 2) the Insurance Code permits 
gender based premiums and exclusion of pregnancy and child-
birth coverage, 3) the actuarial research which justified the dis-
parity in premiums rendered its practice non arbitrary 
discrimination within the meaning of the Unruh Act16 
COURT'S ANALYSIS 
Addressing the first argument, the court found that the 
defendant was a business establishment by relying on the 
broad definition of the term as promulgated by O'Connor v. 
Village Green Homeowners Ass'n. 16 The defendant was subject 
to the Unruh Act, however the court found that only some of 
its practices violated it.17 The court reached this conclusion by 
separating plaintiff's allegations of discrimination into two 
issues: 1) discrimination which affects the rates charged women, 
and 2) discrimination which affects the terms of policies issued 
11. Id at 88, 262 
12. Id. at 88, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 262. 
13. Conditions which are unique to men include prostate cancer and testicular 
cancer. 
14. Id. at 88, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 262. 
15. Id. at 89, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 263. 
16. The term "business establishment" embraces everything about which one can 
be employed, and it is often synonymous with "calling, occupation, or trade engaged 
in for the purpose of making a livelihood or gain." The word "establishment" as 
broadly defined includes ... a permanent "commercial force or organization." O'Connor 
v. Village Green Homeowner's Ass'n 33 Cal.3d 790,795, 662 P.2d 427,430,191 Cal Rptr. 
320, 323 (1983) 
17. Kirsh, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 90,284 Cal. Rptr. at 263 
18. Id. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 263. 
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to women l8• These two issues were then subjected to an 
analysis under the Unruh Actl9 and Insurance Code §1014020 • 
The court stressed that the purpose of the Unruh Act is to 
interdict all arbitrary discrimination by a business enter-
prise21• The court reaffirmed the public policy determination it 
made in Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors22 ; specif-
ically the inclusion of "sex" in the Unruh Act is clearly a dec-
laration of California's public policy mandate and objective that 
men and women be treated equally.23 In light of this public pol-
icy mandate, the court declared that the defendant's prac-
tices on their face could not escape the scrutiny of the Unruh 
Act.:U The court stressed that " ... were our inquiry limited to the 
Unruh Act, summary judgment in favor of the defendant clear-
ly would be improper. "26 
However, the existence of the Insurance Code itself com-
pelled the court to expand the scope of its analysis beyond the 
application of the Unruh Act. The court did so by focusing on 
defendant's argument that Insurance Code §10140 supersedes 
the Unruh Act and thereby permits gender based premiums as 
19. The Unruh Act provides in pertinent part: All persons within the jurisdic-
tion of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, 
or ancestry, national origin, or blindness or other physical disability are entitled to 
the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all 
business establishments of very kind whatsoever. Cal. Civil Code §51 (West 1982) 
20. Insurance Code §l0140 provides in pertinent part: No admitted insurer, 
licensed to issue life or disability insurance, shall fail or refuse to accept an applica-
tion for that insurance, to issue that insurance to an applicant therefore, or issue or 
cancel that insurance, under conditions less favorable to the insured than in compa-
rable cases, except for reasons applicable alike to persons of every race, color, religion, 
national origin, ancestry or sexual orientation. Race, color, religion, national origin, 
ancestry or sexual orientation shall not, of itself, constitute a condition or risk for which 
a higher rate, premium, or charge may be required of the insured for that insurance. 
Cal. Ins. Code §10140 (West 1972) 
21. Kirsh, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 264 
22. Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors 178 Cal App. 3d 1035,224 Cal. 
Rptr. 213 (1986), afrd, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) 
23. Kirsh, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 264 
24. On the issue of differential pricing the court cites from Koire v. Metro Car 
Wash which held that, "differential pricing based on sex is detrimental to both men 
and women because it reinforces harmful stereotypes and is not permissible merely 
because it is profitable. Koire v. Metro Car Wash 40 Cal.3d 24, 32- 38,707 P.2d 195, 
219 Cal. Rptr 133 (1985) 
On the issue of the terms of the policy the court relies on Colorado Civil Rights 
Com. v. Traveler's Ins. Co. which held, "(t)he failure to provide coverage for the 
treatment of pregnancy in an otherwise comprehensive insurance policy discriminates 
against women on the basis of sex as surely as, for example, the failure to provide cov-
erage for the treatment of prostate conditions in a comprehensive policy would dis-
criminate against men on the basis of sex." Colorado Civil Rights Com. v.Traveler's 
Ins. Co. 759 P.2d 1358, 1364 (Colo. 1988) 
25. Kirsh, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 91, 284 Cal. Rptr 264 
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well as exclusion of pregnancy and child birth from the terms of 
coverage.28 The defendant urged the court to rely on a plain read-
ing of Insurance Code §10140 and the Unruh Act and find that 
because sex is omitted from the Insurance Code statute but 
mentioned in the Unruh Act, the Unruh Act did not apply to the 
defendant's practices involving discrimination based on sex.27 
Faced with these two anti discrimination statutes, one 
general (the Unruh Act) the other specific (Insurance Code 
§10140), the court resorted to two basic statutory principles of 
construction: 1) that a specific statute governs a general 
statute, and 2) where one statute contains a provision regard-
ing one subject and a similar statute omits such a provision 
regarding a related subject this omission is an indication of dif-
ferent legislative intent.28 
In applying these principles of statutory interpretation, the 
court concluded the Unruh Act was not applicable to defen-
dant's practice of charging women higher premiums than 
men.29 It was able to so conclude by relying on the plain read-
ing of the two statutes as urged by defendants. Because the 
Insurance Code omits sex from its list of proscribed discrimi-
nation and the Unruh Act clearly includes sex in its list the 
court read a legislative intent to allow insurance companies to 
consider the sex of the insured when issuing or canceling poli-
cies.so This legislative intent is bolstered by the failure of the 
Legislature to include "sex" when it revised Insurance Code 
§10140 to include "sexual orientation" in 1990.31 
However, the court did not accept defendant's argument that 
Insurance Code §10140 allowed it to exclude coverage for preg-
nancy and childbirth from the policies it issued to women.32 The 
court reached this conclusion because Insurance Code §10140 
applies only to the issuance or cancellation of policies.33 The 
Unruh Act remains in full force regarding the issue of terms of 
coverage in defendant's policies.34 The court, relying on 
Colorado Civil Rights Com. v. Traveler's Insurance CO.,36 read-
26. [d. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr at 264. 
27. [d. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr at 264. 
28. [d. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 264. 
29. [d. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 265. 
30. [d. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr at 265. 
31. [d. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 265. 
32. [d. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr at 265. 
33. [d. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr at 265 and see supra Note 18 
34. [d. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 265. 
35. Colorado Civil Rights Com. v. Traveler's Insurance Co. 759 P.2d 1358 (Colo. 
1988) 
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ily found that failure to cover the plaintiff for costs of normal 
pregnancy and childbirth is a violation of the Unruh Act.3s 
DISCUSSION 
The court was quick to rely on general principles of statu-
tory construction when conducting its analysis of the Unruh Act 
and Insurance Code §10140. However, there is one statutory 
principle of construction which the court did not consider. 
This is the principle that a specific statute will not govern a 
general statute if the legislative intent is that the general 
statute should be of universal application notwithstanding 
the specific statute.37 
Arguably the Unruh Act is a general statute meant to be of 
universal application. The discussion in Rotary Club of Duarte 
v. Board of Directors3S is persuasive on this point: 
"The Unruh Act is to be liberally construed with a view of 
effectuating the purposes for which it was enacted and to pro-
mote justice ... One of the policies underlying the enactment of 
the Unruh Act is the eradication of discrimination by private 
or public action on the basis of sex by 'business establish-
ments' in the furnishing of accommodations, advantages, facil-
ities, privileges or services.'" 
In view of this language, it is difficult to perceive that the 
Unruh Act was not meant to be universally applied. The court 
conceded defendant's practice of charging women higher pre-
miums than men is clearly discriminatory and thus violates the 
Unruh Act.39 In spite of this, the court chose not to invoke a uni-
versal application of the Unruh Act. 
One must bear in mind that the court "chose" to base its find-
ing on a reconciliation of the two statutes (and therefore prompt-
ed the most damaging result). The court did not consider 
defendant's third argument; that the actuary tables on which 
it based its rates rendered gender specific premiums non-
36. Kirsh, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 92, 284 Cal Rptr. at 265 
37. 58 Cal. Jur.3d Statutes §l09 (1980) provides in part: (A) special statute 
dealing expressly with a particular subject constitutes an exception so as to control and 
take precedence over a conflicting general statute on the same subject .... But this rule 
has no application if the two statutes can be reconciled ... or if it is manifest that the 
legislative intention is that the general act should be of universal application notwith-
standing the special act. 
38. Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035,224 Cal. 
Rptr. 218 (1986), afrd, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) 
39. Kirsh 233 Cal. App. 3d at 91, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 264 
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arbitrary discrimination,40 thus not violative of the Unruh 
Act41. Although the end result of exploring this argument 
might have been the same42, the implications might have been 
less harmful to the integrity of the Unruh Act. Further, in 
choosing to selectively apply the Unruh Act to defendant's 
practices by stating that a specific statute can supersede this 
general anti-discrimination statute, this court is permitting 
clever "result driven" drafting by the legislature (or insurance 
companies) that results in practices which the Unruh Act 
specifically prohibits. 
On a positive note, the court did announce that it is gender 
based discrimination and a violation of the Unruh Act to omit 
coverage for normal pregnancy and childbirth from compre-
hensive health insurance policies issued to women.4S This 
issue had never been decided by the court, and its willingness 
to rely on a Colorado Supreme Court case is significant." 
Although the court cites only that portion of Colorado Civil 
Rights Com. v. Traveler's Ins. CO.46 which unequivocally declares 
that failure to cover pregnancy and childbirth in a compre-
hensive health insurance policy is gender based discrimination, 
it implicitly accepts the reasoning used by the Colorado court 
to reach its decision. In Colorado Civil Rights Com. v. 
Traveler's, the Colorado Supreme Court clearly stated that 
an insurance company is discriminating against its insureds, 
based on their gender, when the insurance company fails to 
cover its female insureds for pregnancy and childbirth". Its 
holding rejected framing the issue of such discrimination in 
non-gender based terms which would have compelled an anal-
ysis that this policy failed to cover women for pregnancy and 
40. In support of the motion defendant submitted the declaration of an actuary 
who stated: Defendant charges women in the 20-64 age group a higher premium for 
the policy than it charges men in the same age group; this result is consistent with 
and justified by defendant's claim cost experience which shows that defendant pays 
out more in health care benefits to women than to men in the 20-64 age group. Kirsh 
233 Cal. App. 3d 88, 284 Cal. Rptr 262-3 
41. [d. at 89, Cal. Rptr. at 263. 
42. If defendant had shown that the actuary tables on which premium decisions 
were made did not include in its variables the frequency and cost of claims related to 
pregnancy and childbirth defendant's argument would have been strong. If howev-
er, the defendant had included frequency and cost of claims for pregnancy and child-
birth among the variables in its actuary tables, clearly their pricing policy would be 
discriminatory. Not only would they be charging women more than men, but they 
would be charging women more based on the frequency and cost of conditions for which 
they refused to cover women absent an additional policy or rider. 
43. [d. at 92, 284 Cal. Rptr at 266. 
44. [d. at 90-1, 284 Cal. Rptr at 264. 
46. Colorado Civil Rights Com. v. Traveler's Ins. Co. 769 P.2d 1368 (Colo. 1988). 
46. [d. at 1361 
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childbirth based on its effect on pregnant women versus non-
pregnant people.4? By primarily referring to Colorado Civil 
Rights Com. v. Traveler's and citing two other cases which 
also reject such a formulation48 the California Court of Appeal 
has joined those states who have unequivocally stated that 
pregnancy is an issue which is framed by gender.49 
However, what appears to be a bold step is merely an empty 
gesture. The court stated that pregnancy is an issue framed by 
gender, but with the same breath gave insurance companies a 
green light to arbitrarily discriminate against women when 
determining the premiums for policies issued to women. While 
mandating that insurance companies insure women for preg-
nancy and childbirth, the court still refuses to protect women 
from potentially discriminatory pricing policies. Failure to 
determine whether defendant's practices constitute arbitrary 
or non-arbitrary discrimination gives insurance companies no 
guidelines by which they may determine the premiums they 
charge. For example, may insurance companies base their 
premium for a policy without coverage for pregnancy and child-
birth (if a woman agrees that she does not wish to be covered 
for these conditions) on an actuary table which includes the fre-
quency and cost of covering insureds for those very conditions? 
The court's failure here to investigate just how pricing decisions 
are reached may open the floodgates to unjustifiably higher 
rates charged to women than to men. Consider that if the 
plaintiff had accepted the pregnancy rider the full amount of her 
insurance per year would have amounted to $2,395.20 as 
opposed to $689.80 for a man similarly situated. 
Perhaps as a result of Kirsh the cost of policies issued to 
women will be grossly disproportionate as compared to policies 
issued to men. Before Kirsh they were only slightly dispro-
portionate. 
Jel!sica Rudin* 
47. 1d. at 1361 
48. Quaker Oats Co. v. Cedar Rapids Human Rights Com. 268 N.W. 2d 862 
(Iowa 1978); Massachusetts Electric Co. v. Massachusetts Commission Against 
Discrimination 375 Mass. 160,375 N.E. 2d 1192 (1978) 
49. Kirsh, 233 Cal. App. 3d at 91,284 Cal. Rptr. at 264 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993. 
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